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PRISONERS OF THEIR OWN JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH
AND FIFTH AMENDMENT CASES IN THE
SUPREME COURT
DANIEL J. CAPRA*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A

FTER the breakthroughs of the Warren Court and the partial
retrenchment of the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court appears to have grown weary of pursuing any doctrinal developments in fourth and fifth amendment jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court's recent fourth and fifth amendment decisions
consist of generally tame applications of fact to law.
This situation is, in part, a result of the unique interplay between the Warren Court and its successors. The current Court
has conservative instincts. It is clear that this Court would never
have handed down many of the decisions rendered by the Warren
Court. Yet to a conservative Court, the effect of stare decisis is to
avoid a head-on re-examination of Warren Court case law. Recognizing this limitation, the Burger Court resigned itself to imposing minor limitations which, in the aggregate, did somewhat
cut back on the Warren Court positions. However, this also resulted in confusing and unanalytical doctrinal development.'
Much of this confusion must be attributed to the Burger Court's
attempts to put a different "spin" on Warren Court precedent
2
while ostensibly remaining true to structure.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to
thank Bruce Green and Steve Saltzburg for their helpful comments concerning
this Article, and my colleague Georgene Vairo for her continuing support.
1. See generally Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1436 (1987); Kamisar, The Warren Court (Is It Really So Defense
Minded?) the Burger Court (Is It Really So ProsecutionOriented?) and Police Investigatory
Practices,in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Blasi

ed. 1983); Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure
in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO: L.J. 151 (1980).
2. For example, the Burger Court gutted the exclusionary rule, but retained
its structure as deterrence-based-even though as limited by the Burger Court

(1267)
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The Burger Court's case-by-case sniping was abandoned by
the Rehnquist Court. The latter has apparently found itself with
doctrine it finds not entirely acceptable but nonetheless workable
and with which it may decide fourth and fifth amendment cases to
its own satisfaction. In many cases, the Rehnquist Court appears
to use whatever precedent is at band, without concern for future
doctrinal development. 3 Thus, in recent years, the Court has become less like a Supreme Court and more like a lower court. 4 In
only a few cases has the current Court tried to investigate, clarify

or advance fourth or fifth amendment law. Hence, the unsatisfactory amalgam of Warren Court advancement and Burger Court
tinkering remains the law. 5 Indeed, with the occasional exception
ofJustice Scalia, the Court appears willing to remain a prisoner of
6
its own fourth and fifth amendment jurisprudence.
the exclusionary rule has little deterrent effect. See Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72
GEO. L.J. 185, 192 (1983) (Burger Court held that exclusionary rule was judicially created remedy and not personal constitutional right; therefore Court applied rule only when deterrent benefits outweighed costs of excluding evidence).
3. The Court's unreasoned and unexamined application of fact to law is
apparent in the recent case County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661
(1991). In McLaughlin, the Court held that the state's failure to make a probable
cause determination until 48 hours after the suspect was arrested was not per se
unreasonable. Id. at 1670. In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), which held that any probable cause determination must be made promptly after arrest. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. at 1669. The
McLaughlin Court relied on Gerstein and its "prompt" terminology as if it provided some talismanic solution. In so doing, the Court failed to consider the
historical underpinnings of the fourth amendment, the reasons for having a
prompt post-arrest hearing, or the individual interests at stake. McLaughlin, 111
S. Ct. at 1674-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Green, "Power Not Reason " Justice
Marshall's Valedictory and the FourthAmendment in the Supreme Court's 1990 Term, 70
No. CAR. L. REV. 373, 407-09 (1992) (comparing decision in McLaughlin with
other fourth amendment decisions of the term and suggesting a preference for
post hoc reasoning rather than principled decisionmaking).
4. Lower courts routinely provide more analysis of fourth and fifth amendment jurisprudence than provided by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Weidner v.
Thieret, 866 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1989) (providing justification and recharacterization of confusing Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning involuntary
confessions).
5. See generally Saltzburg, supra note 1 (criticizing both Warren and Burger
Courts for failing to maintain doctrinal consistency).
6. Unlike his counterparts, who seem content to fit the case before them
into unexamined precedent, Justice Scalia appears prepared to analyze fourth
and fifth amendment questions on the basis of first principles. For example,
Justice Scalia has recently rethought the fourth amendment law pertaining to
seizure. Rather than adhering to the mechanical test of whether a reasonable
person would feel free to walk away from an officer, Justice Scalia has reasoned
that the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable seizures "preserves for
our citizens the traditional protections against unlawful arrest afforded by the
common law." McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. at 1672 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
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Of course, I do not contend that the Court should engage in

a wholesale overruling of fourth and fifth amendment precedent.
Overruling precedent obviously can be as unreasoned and resultoriented as slavish adherence. 7 I merely contend that the Court
should not blindly follow existing precedent when confronted
with fourth and fifth amendment issues. The present Court
should not allow the patchwork quilt of Warren and Burger Court
jurisprudence to tie its hands in the name of stare decisis, unless
that jurisprudence withstands critical examination. More importantly, the Court should revisit these foundational precedents
continually to provide fresh explanation of the law and its application to the fact situation before it. It should revitalize, not simply
adhere to, its precedents. In other words, the Rehnquist Court
must provide guidance, rather than votes on a certain specific fact
situation.
This Article examines the United States Supreme Court's
fourth and fifth amendment j'urisprudence by focusing on cases
decided during the 1989-90 term. My intent is to demonstrate
that the Court has abdicated its responsibility to do more than
apply fact to unquestioned law. This Article also briefly visits the
1990-91 term, and finds that the Court's lackadaisical decisionmaking has continued largely unabated.

II.
A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES

Constitutionality of Sobriety Checkpoint Stops

1. Discussion of Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz

Ordinarily, a search or seizure requires a warrant and probable cause.8 The Court has held that the warrant clause is the
predominant clause of the fourth amendment. 9 However, where
California v. Hodari D., III S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (fourth amendment "seizure"
requires either some application of physical force or a show of authority to
which the subject yields).
7. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Dismayed by the majority's decision to overrule Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496 (1987), Justice Marshall noted: "Power, not reason, is the new
currency of this Court's decisionmaking." Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2618 (Marshall,J.,
dissenting). See also Green, supra note 3, at 378 (Court's recent fourth amend-

ment decisions based largely on majority's shared personal preferences favoring
law enforcement over privacy interests and majority's recognition of power to
enact preferences into law).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause..

").

9. See generally T. TAYLOR, Two

STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
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the needs effectuated by the intrusion are special needs beyond
mere law enforcement, the Court has dispensed with the warrant
and probable cause requirements in favor of a balancing of interests test in which the Court focuses on the reasonableness of the
search and seizure.' 0
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz 1 is useful as a clarification of when special needs beyond law enforcement are necessary to justify suspicionless intrusions. It also clarifies the
majority's approach to balancing interests under the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment.' 2 Yet these clarifications
fail to break new ground, and the Court's opinion is a simple application of fact to law. The Court neither examines, nor questions, the underlying law itself.
At issue was a Michigan sobriety checkpoint program that allowed police to set up checkpoints along state roads. These
checkpoints were set up according to a list of considerations, including "safety of the location," "minimum inconvenience for the
driver," and available space "to pull the vehicle off the traveled
portion of the roadway for further inquiry if necessary."' 3 Then,
any motorists passing through the checkpoint would be stopped
by police and briefly examined for signs of intoxication. If such
signs were detected, the officers would direct the motorist to another area where they would check the motorist's license and registration, and conduct further sobriety tests if warranted.14 The
only checkpoint operated under the program resulted in a stop of
126 vehicles, and one arrest for drunk driving. 15
The Court in Sitz focused solely on the constitutionality of
the initial stop of motorists and any preliminary investigation incident to detention. 18 Writing for the majority, ChiefJustice Rehn23-24 (1969) (suggesting that Court has "stood the Amendment on its head" by
reading warrant clause as controlling clause of fourth amendment).
10. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of student by
school official); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (drug
testing of public employees).
11. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
12. See 1J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1:21, at 33-34 (2d ed. 1991) ("The
Fourth Amendment has two clauses; the unreasonable searches clause and the
warrant clause.").
13. Id. at 2492 n.5.
14. Id. at 2484.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2485. In Sitz, the majority explicitly recognizes the limited scope
of the issue before it. It said: "Itis important to recognize what our inquiry is
not about .... [T]he instant action challenges only the use of sobriety checkpoints generally." Id. (emphasis in original).
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quist relied heavily on the reasonableness balancing approach
used in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,'7 in which the Court upheld
suspicionless stops of motorists at permanent fixed checkpoints
to check for illegal aliens.
The respondents in Sitz argued that the reasonableness balancing approach did not apply to sobriety checkpoints, because
there was no special interest at stake beyond law enforcement as
sobriety checkpoints are merely a means to enforce the criminal
laws prohibiting drunk driving.18
The majority rejected this argument, holding that it was not
necessary to find a special need beyond mere law enforcement in
order to engage in reasonableness balancing. 19 The Court relied
on Martinez-Fuerte, which in turn relied on Terry v. Ohio.20 Terry
also employed reasonableness balancing, but on grounds different from those employed in the "special needs" cases: Terry allowed a police officer to stop persons based on reasonable
suspicion of criminal behavior provided that the nature of the intrusion was limited; Terry also allowed a concomitant limited
search for self-protection of the officer. 2 ' Martinez-Fuerte took
Terry one step further and allowed a stop without suspicion, given
the nature of fixed checkpoints. 22 In contrast, the line of "special
needs" cases allows a seizure and search for evidence, provided
the motive of the search is to effectuate a special need beyond
criminal law enforcement.
Having found it allowable under Terry to balance the nature
of the intrusion against the state interest at stake, the Sitz Court
proceeded to downplay the intrusiveness of a stop occurring at a
fixed checkpoint. The Court relied upon the fixed (albeit temporary) nature of the checkpoint to conclude that there was no risk
of arbitrariness or abuse of authority, no surprise or humiliation
in the stop itself and no long-term seizure. 28 The Court empha17. 428 U.S. 543 (1975).
18. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485.
19. Id. In Naugle v. Witney, 755 F. Supp. 1504, 1520 (C.D. Utah 1990), the
court said Sitz allowed it to use reasonableness balancing when scrutinizing a
suspicionless stop to inform the driver that the police had a search warrant for
his home and to ask his help in getting past the electric fence, surveillance system and guard dogs. 755 F. Supp. at 1520. Balancing "the inconvenience and
intrusion of the stop against [the driver's interest in learning of the Warrant
and police concerns about entry to the premises," the court held that the stop
was reasonable and did not violate the fourth amendment. Id.
20. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21. Id. at 30-3 1.
22. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-59 (1975).
23. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2486-87. The Court asserted that "[alt traffic check-
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sized that checkpoints were selected pursuant to set guidelines
and that uniformed police officers stopped every car.2 4 The

Court concluded that "the intrusion resulting from the brief stop
at the sobriety checkpoint [was] for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerie."' 25 Crucially, the Sitz Court found the temporary sobriety
check points no more intrusive than the permanent ones upheld
28

in Martinez-Fuerte.

Against this limited intrusion, the Court balanced the state's
heavy interest in eradicating drunken driving. 27 It addressed the
lower court's contention that sobriety checkpoints did not effectively advance this undeniable state interest.28 Specifically, the
Court recognized that earlier cases considered whether the search
or seizure would actually effectuate the state interest in evaluating
the legitimacy of the challenged conduct. For instance, in Delaware v. Prouse,29 the Court prohibited random, suspicionless vehicle safety and registration checks in part because they were not
effective in assuring compliance with safety and registration
points the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see
visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened
or annoyed by the intrusion." Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 558 (1975)).
In Sitz, the stops lasted 25 seconds on average. Id. at 2484. In People v.
Rister, 803 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1990), the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a sobriety checkpoint, one which was arguably less efficient than the checkpoint in Sitz,
where the stops averaged three minutes. The Colorado checkpoint also was
found not to violate the state constitution. Rister, 803 P.2d at 490-91; see also Orr
v. People, 803 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1990) (same).
24. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487.
25. Id. Professor Strosser gives a different estimation of the intrusiveness
of the sobriety checkpoint. See Strosser, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sit:
A Roadblock to MeaningfulJudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalRights, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 285 (1991). According to Professor Strosser, "these searches are intensely
personal in nature, involving a police officer's close-range examination of the
driver's face, breath, voice, clothing, hands, and movements." Id. at 287. During the initial stop, the multiple examinations included "looking at the driver's
face and eyes to see whether they were, respectively, flushed or bloodshot;
smelling the driver's breath to determine whether it bore an odor of alcohol;
engaging the driver in conversation to hear whether his voice was slurred; and
inspecting the driver's shirt to see whether it was unbuttoned." Id. at 295.
26. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486. However, in his dissent, Justice Stevens finds a
"critical difference" between temporary checkpoints and permanent and fixed
checkpoints. Id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 2485 ("No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the
drunken driving problem or the State's interest in eradicating it.").
28. Id. at 2487.
29. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/1

6

Capra: Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: Fourth and Fifth Amendment

1991)

PRISONERS OF THEIR OWN JURISPRUDENCE

1273

requirements.O
The majority responded that cases such as Prouse were not
intended "to transfer from politically accountable officials to the
courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law
enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger." 3' The Court concluded that "the choice
among such reasonable alternatives remains with the government
officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility
for, limited public resources." 3 2 Accordingly, the majority
faulted the lower court for its "searching examination" of the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints.3 3
After Sitz, when a state's interest is balanced under the reasonableness clause, the court must take a hands off approach, and
give extreme deference to the state's choice of how best to effectuate its asserted interest. That is, once the state's asserted interest is deemed to be significant, the court must assume that the
state has chosen a plan which will adequately effectuate that interest. Hence, it must allow the intrusion.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall, Justice
Brennan "searche[d] ... in vain for any acknowledgment that the
reason for employing the balancing test is that the seizure is minimally intrusive."'3 4 He said that suspicionless detentions were the
antithesis of fourth amendment principles as they would subject
the public to arbitrary and harassing police conduct.3 5 Justice
Brennan contended that the limited controls on officer discretion
imposed by fixed checkpoints were no substitute for a standard of
articulable suspicion.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion joined in large
part by Justices Brennan and Marshall in which he argued that the
majority misapplied the reasonableness balancing test, by overvaluing the law enforcement interest at stake and undervaluing
the citizen's interest in privacy.3 6 Furthermore, Justice Stevens
found the majority's reliance on Martinez-Fuerteunpersuasive. He
argued that unlike the permanent, fixed checkpoint, the police
operating a sobriety checkpoint "have extremely broad discretion
30. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487 (construing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
.(1979)).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

110 S. Ct. at 2487.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2489 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2490 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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in determining the exact timing and placement of the roadblock." 3 7 That is, while the fixed checkpoint controls the discretion of whether to make a stop, the nature of the checkpoint does
not control the discretion as to where the checkpoint should be
placed. Moreover, a temporary checkpoint is more intrusive because of the element of surprise that it presents.3 8
Finally, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's determination that the sobriety checkpoint was'sufficiently effective to outweigh its intrusiveness. He argued that the majority ignored the
fact that other police methods, such as roving patrols that stop
cars based on reasonable suspicion, would be far more effective in
combatting the drunk driving problem.3 9 Yet, Justice Stevens did
not directly address the majority's assertion that the courts
should not second-guess the state's choice among reasonable
alternatives.
2. Implications of Sitz
Sitz suggests that the state interest is likely to prevail when
balanced against individual interests under the reasonableness
clause of the fourth amendment. 40 The majority's analysis shows
considerable deference both to the state interest and to the state's
chosen methods for effectuating that interest.
For example, the Court imposed no time, place or manner
restrictions on the use of a temporary checkpoint. The guidelines
set forth in the Michigan plan, which the Court approved without
37. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (StevensJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued:

A driver who discovers an unexpected checkpoint on a familiar local
road will be startled and distressed. She may infer, correctly, that the
checkpoint is not simply "business as usual," and may likewise infer,
again correctly, that the police have made a discretionary decision to

focus their law enforcement efforts upon her and others who pass the
chosen point.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

39. Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Steven noted:
The Court's analysis of this issue resembles a business decision
that measures profits by counting gross receipts and ignoring expenses .... [S]obriety checkpoints result in the arrest of a fraction of
one percent of the drivers who are stopped, but there is absolutely no

evidence that this figure represents an increase over the number of arrests that would have been made by using the same law enforcement
resources in conventional patrols.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 639 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that whenever reasonableness balancing has
been employed, the state interest has been held to outweigh the individual
interest).
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much consideration, do not regulate how often authorities may

use checkpoints, or the neighborhoods in which they may use
them. While the stops themselves are free from police discretion,
the decision where and how to place the checkpoints to make the
stops is subject to considerable discretion. As far as the Court
was concerned, officers who have a hunch that a driver is up to
something can speed ahead of the driver and set up a special
checkpoint just for him, so long as others are stopped as well.
Most importantly, the effectiveness of the plan is basically irrelevant to the fourth amendment reasonableness analysis. Apparently, if one person is arrested out of two thousand stopped,
the balance of state and individual interests remains the same.
This is the next step from the Court's analysis in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab,4 1 where the Court considered the effectiveness of a drug testing plan in conjectural terms: it is not
the degree of incidence that is relevant, but the gravity of harm
that can occur if a problem arises.4 2 The Court in Sitz took that
view, but added an extra caution to lower courts not to second
guess the state in determining whether the plan effectuates its
43
own interest.
It is important to note that Sitz is a seizure case. It does not
allow a search for law enforcement purposes on less than probable cause. The Court has allowed searches on less than probable
cause in only two circumstances: 1) to search for weapons for the
self-protection of police-officers as allowed in Terry, and 2) to
search for evidence, where there are special needs beyond mere
law enforcement as allowed in Von Raab. In contrast, a search by
law enforcement officers for evidence of criminal activity has been
held not subject to reasonableness balancing and must be supported by probable cause. In Arizona v. Hicks,4 4 the Court rejected
a reasonableness balancing approach to a search of a dwelling for
evidence by law enforcement officials, arguing that the dissent's
characterization of the conduct as a mere "cursory inspection"
rather than a "full blown search" was inaccurate. 4 5 Likewise, in
United States v. Winsor,46 the United States Court of Appeals for
41. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (drug testing of public employees).
42. IM at 1395.
43. See Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487.
44. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
45. Id. at 328.
46. 846 F.2d 1569, 1579 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding limited visual
intrusion into hotel room by law enforcement officers, upon reasonable suspicion, cannot be justified under reasonableness clause). The Winsor court stated:
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the Ninth Circuit held en banc that probable cause was required
for a cursory inspection of a hotel room to look for arrestees.
In Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District,4 7 the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit implied that reasonable suspicion could justify limited law enforcement searches. 48
The court allowed dog sniffs of students upon reasonable suspicion, reasoning that while a search, this is a limited intrusion. 49
Horton was decided before Hicks, which limits the Terry analysis to
seizures, so Horton cannot be said to state the far-ranging proposition that a law enforcement search can be done on reasonable
suspicion. Another intervening case, however, lends support to
the result in Horton. In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,5O the Court upheld
searches of students upon reasonable suspicion on the ground
that such searches serve special needs beyond law enforcement.51
More fundamentally, Horton involved a canine sniff and under the
intervening case of United States v. Place,52 the United States
Supreme Court held that a canine sniff does not constitute a
search because it can only determine whether contraband is present, and there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in
5
contraband. 3
In Place, the dog sniffed the defendant's luggage. The lower
courts that have allowed limited searches on reasonable suspicion
"[W]e refuse the government's invitation to decide this case by balancing the
competing interests at stake. Instead, we adhere to the bright line rule that Hicks
appears to have announced.. .

."; see also

United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (dog sniff of train sleeper compartment not justified as limited
intrusion supported by reasonable suspicion, but justified as no search at all).
Other circuit courts have upheld searches based on reasonable suspicion on the
ground that the search in issue was a limited intrusion. Cf United States v.
Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir.) (sufficiently substantial law enforcement interest in curtailing narcotics smuggling and minimal intrusion of search permits
search on less than probable cause), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988), United
States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991) (insertion of key into lock is
search, but is permissible upon reasonable suspicion).
47. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
48. d. at 481-82. The Fifth Circuit cited with approval a standard of"reasonable individualized suspicion." Id.
49. Id. at 479. The Fifth Circuit said that the use of dogs to sniff students
for drugs is clearly a search for fourth amendment purposes. Id at 478. However, the court said that a dog sniffing a student to discover contraband, "particularly where the dogs actually touch the person ...

may be analogous to the

warrantless 'stop and frisk' upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis of a suspicion that fell short of probable cause." Id. at 479 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968)).

50. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
51. Id. (search of student by school official).

52. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
53. Id. at 707.
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have generally done so in dog sniff cases where the dog sniffed a
house or its equivalent, such as a sleeper compartment of a train.
These lower courts have sought to limit Place by distinguishing
dog sniffs of more private areas than those at stake in Place. But
this distinction is misguided in two respects. First, the rationale
of Place is that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
contraband, 54 and therefore a law enforcement technique that can
only determine whether contraband is present cannot be a search.
The logic of Place extends to a dog sniff of any area. 55 Second,
and more importantly, an attempt to limit Place in these cases has
created the perverse result of abrogating the Hicks probable cause
requirement. After holding the dog sniff a search, these courts
then proceed to justify the search as a limited intrusion, supportable by reasonable suspicion. 5 6 It makes no sense to limit the discrete intrusion of dog searches by invoking the much broader
principle that if a law enforcement search is a limited intrusion, it
can be supported by a standard of proof less than probable cause.
The Court's permissive attitude toward fixed checkpoints can
have significant implications in federal drug cases. First, a checkpoint to stop all cars to examine drivers for signs of drug use
would be permissible under Sitz, given the state interest is high
and the intrusion is limited. Second, a checkpoint for another
limited reason, such as to check licenses and registrations, can
lead to evidence of drug activity. For instance, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. MoralesZamora57 recently upheld a dog sniff of a car which resulted in a
positive alert while the car was being checked for registration at a
temporary checkpoint. 58 The seizure was permissible under
54. Id.; see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]mplicit in Place [is the idea] that individuals in our society have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the fact that they have contraband in their
possession . . ").

55. See United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (dog sniff of
train sleeper compartment cannot be justified as limited intrusion supported by
reasonable suspicion, but can be justified as no search at all).
56. United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 853, 855-57 (4th Cir. 1988)
(because train sleeper compartment is not temporary home, defendant has di-

minished expectation of privacy; thus, fourth amendment did not require police
to have more than reasonable suspicion before they could bring trained dogs
into defendant's train compartment to sniff his luggage).
57. 914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1990).
58. Id. at 205 (individualized reasonable suspicion not required for dog

sniff once vehicle has been lawfully detained).
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Sitz5 9 and the dog sniff was not a search under Place.60 It could be
argued that a registration checkpoint is a pretext when there just
happens to be a drug-sniffing dog at the checkpoint. But in most
lower courts, the possibility of pretext makes no difference as
long as the police had the right under the fourth amendment to
61
act as they did.

Sitz breaks no new analytical ground. It does clarify the distinction between special needs searches and Terry seizures, but in
the end it is a simple application of Terry principles. While the
Court upholds suspicionless seizures, as distinct from Terry stops

based upon reasonable suspicion, the fact is that suspicionless
Terry seizures had already been allowed in Martinez-Fuerte. Nor
does Sitz answer any of the more complex analytical questions,
such as whether a limited search for evidence of drunk driving at
a fixed checkpoint can be upheld on the basis of reasonable suspicion. The answer, after Hicks, would appear to be no, but the
Court avoids this question in Sitz. Additionally, Sitz fails to address whether a driver can be shuttled to a secondary inspection

area in the absence of suspicion. Applying Martinez-Fuerte, the answer would appear to be yes, but the Court avoids this question in
Sitz. Acting much like a lower court, the Supreme Court in Sitz

applied settled precedent to an unambiguous fact pattern, and
left these more difficult questions for another day.
Even more disturbing, the Court in Sitz made no attempt to
evaluate the merit of the precedent on which it so heavily relied.
We may legitimately ask whether the balancing approach of Terry
and Martinez-Fuerte should be applied to wholesale stops as op59. Id. at 203. The Morales-Zamora court said a brief roadblock set up for
the valid purpose of checking driver's licenses and registrations did not require
individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.
60. Id. at 205 ("We find the factual circumstances of the [search] at issue to
be legally indistinguishable from the facts of Place."). The Court said that the
intrusion here was minimal-"the sniffs did not inconvenience the defendants in
any manner," and there is no legitimate expectation of privacy to concealed contraband anyway. Id. at 204-05.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990)
(applying majority rule that pretext is irrelevant and collecting cases); United
States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[S]o long as the police are
doing no more than they are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do,
an arrest is constitutional."); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th
Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively
authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant
....
"). The Eleventh Circuit will invalidate an intrusion as pretextual where a
reasonable officer would not have made the intrusion if not for the pretext of
investigating a more serious crime. See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704,
708 (11th Cir. 1986).
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posed to discrete ones. It can even be questioned whether Terry
itself makes sense.6 2 And it certainly is open to discussion
whether the Court should extend the reasonableness balancing
approach of Terry so as to swallow the probable cause requirement for all seizures. The Court makes no attempt to deal with
any of these difficult questions. 63
B.

Anonymous Informant's Tip with Corroboration
Creates Reasonable Suspicion

1. Discussion of Alabama v. White
In Alabama v. White, 64 the Rehnquist Court, consistent with
prior Burger Court precedent, allowed an anonymous tip that was
partially corroborated to constitute reasonable suspicion to -support a Terry stop.6 5 In White, police received an anonymous tip
that White would be leaving a particular apartment in a brown
Plymouth station wagon with the right tail-light lens broken, and
would be driving to Dobey's Motel with a brown attachE case containing cocaine. 66 The officers went to the apartment, and saw
White enter a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right
tail-light. 6 7 She was not carrying an attach6 case. 6 8 The police
followed the station wagon as it took the most direct route to
Dobey's Motel.6 9 They stopped White just short of Dobey's
Motel, and she consented to the search of a brown attache case
that had been in the car before she entered it.70 The officers
found marijuana in the attache case, and three milligrams of cocaine in White's purse, which was searched during processing at
the station. 71 The issue for the Court was whether there was reasonable suspicion to make the stop, given that the tip was from an
anonymous informant and that none of the activity corroborated
was in any way suspicious.
Justice White, writing for a six-person majority, held that the
62. See generally, Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the
Mischief of Camaraand Terry, 72 MINN. L. REv. 383 (1988).
63. See Note, Fourth Amendment-The Constitutionality of a Sobriety Checkpoint
Program, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 800 (1991).
64. 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
65. Id. at 2415 (informant's tip, while insufficient to support arrest or
search warrant may have sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify forcible stop).
66. Id. at 2414.
67. Id.
68. ld
69. Id.

70. Id. at 2414-15.
71. Id. at 2414.
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stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.72 The Court's analysis was an amalgam of two lines of authority. First, the Court
relied heavily on the totality of circumstances approach to informant's tips as supporting probable cause, originally established in
Illinois v. Gates.73
In Gates, the Court made a minor inroad on the Warren
Court's rigorous scrutiny of informants' tips announced in Spinelli
v. United States.74 The Spinelli Court had held that for a tip to be
credited toward probable cause, the magistrate must be assured
that the informant was reliable and that there was a sufficient basis of knowledge. 75 A defect on either prong would invalidate the
tip, unless independent police investigation substantially corroborated the tip as to material details. 76 Gates overruled Spinelli's
rigid requirements, but in typical Burger Court fashion, the Gates
Court retained the Spinelli structure, and merely loosened it at the
margins. 77 Thus, the Court still looks to the two prongs of veracity and basis of knowledge, and to the possibility of corroboration, but the impact of corroboration is viewed more flexibly and
78
expansively under Gates than previously.
The second established line of cases used in White is that proceeding from Adams v. Williams 79 where the Court upheld a stop
based on a known informant's tip, even though the tip was not
enough to satisfy the then-applicable Spinelli standards.80 The
Court in Adams concluded that Spinelli's requirements for probable cause were unnecessarily rigorous for the lesser standard of
reasonable suspicion. 8 ' In other words, reasonable suspicion is
72. Id.

73. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
74. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
75. Id. at 415-16.

76. For a thorough analysis of the Spinelli test, see Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar And Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974).

77. For an analysis of the effect of Gates, see Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465

(1984). See also Saltzburg, supra note 1, at 153 ("The differences between the
Warren and the Burger decisions tend to be more at the margin than at the heart
of the constitutional principles for which the Warren Court is remembered.").
78. Also, a defect in one prong can be compensated by a particularly strong
showing on the other. This is unlike Spinelli, where an informant's tip had to
satisfy both prongs to be counted toward probable cause.
79. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
80. Id. at 147. The Court concedes that "the informant's unverified tip may
have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant" under Spinelli. Id.
However, the information did have sufficient "indicia of reliability to justify the
officer's forcible stop of [the defendant]." Id.
81. Id.
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not only a lesser standard of proof, it is also less rigorous in the
types of information that can be used as proof.
The majority opinion in White simply applies the reasoning of
Adams to the post-Gates era. The majority found that the factors of
basis of knowledge and veracity are also relevant in the reasonable suspicion context.8 2 But Justice White reasoned that these
factors must be applied even more permissively than under the
Gates approach, since reasonable suspicion is a less rigorous standard of proof than probable cause.83
Even given the lesser showing required, Justice White acknowledged that the anonymous tip in the instant case did not
itself provide reasonable suspicion, because it did not show that
the informant was reliable, nor did it give any indication of the
informant's basis for predicting White's activities.8 4 However,
that did not end the analysis. While the tip did not stand on its
own, even for reasonable suspicion, the majority found that, as
with probable cause, corroboration of the tip could lead to a finding of reasonable suspicion.85 The crucial question in White, then,
was the strength of corroboration that would be required to sup86
port a defective tip.
Justice White determined that the corroboration in White was
not as substantial as that in Gates.8 7 In Gates, for instance, the officers corroborated relatively unique travel plans, with more details than those given by the informant in White. Also, the
defendants in Gates were observed to engage in somewhat suspi82. Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415 (1990).
83. Id.
84. Id. HoweverJustice White said, "(t)his is not to say that an anonymous
caller could never provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop."
Id.
85. Id. at 2417.
86. Id. at 2416. Note that the reliability of an anonymous tip can become
irrelevant if the investigation that is made to corroborate the tip uncovers articulable facts which themselves support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In United States v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11.1 S. Ct.
977 (1991), the police received an anonymous tip that drug dealing was going
on in an apartment hallway in a building known to police for drug activity.
When uniformed officers entered the building, the defendant fled at the sight of
them. Id. at 898. The flight of the defendant along with officers' prior knowledge that the building had problems with drug. trafficking provided the officers
with a reasonable basis for conducting an investigative stop and made it "unnecessary to decide whether the anonymous tip in this case was sufficiently corroborated .... ." Id. The fact that the police carried out the stop with drawn guns did
not convert it into an arrest. Id. at 899.
87. While, 110 S. Ct. at 2416 ("[Here], the tip was not as detailed and the
corrobation was not as complete, as Gates . . ").
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cious travel activity. There was nothing unique, suspicious or detailed about the travel activity in White. 88
However, the fact that the corroboration was less than that
necessary to satisfy probable cause was held not fatal in White.

The Court reasoned that because reasonable suspicion is a less
stringent standard than probable cause, the degree of corroboration required to support reasonable suspicion could be correspondingly less. 89 The lesser standard is a reduction in both

quantity and quality of proof.90 This reasoning is straight out of
Adams v. Williams.
The Court found that the stop of White was based on reasonable suspicion, even though the corroboration of the tip was not
complete, and in fact the tip was not correct in some details. 9 1
Justice White acknowledged that corroboration of the mere existence of the car was insignificant, because "anyone could have predicted that fact because it was a condition presumably existing at
the time of the call." 92 What was important was the caller's ability
88. Cf United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 671 (1991). In Alvarez, after an anonymous tip that a man who "looks
kinda Mexican" in a white Mustang GT, was going to rob a bank, and was "probably in back of the bank," police drove to the bank and observed an Hispanic
looking man parked in a white Mustang across from the bank, who drove away
after a marked police car passed by. Id. at 835. This was held to be enough
corroboration to provide reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop.
Id. at 836-37.
89. White, 110 S. Ct. at 2416 (reasonable suspicion established with information different in quantity or content than that required for probable cause
and reasonable suspicion can arise from less reliable information than that required for probable cause). See Note, FourthAmendment-ProtectionsAgainst Unreasonable Search and Seizure: The Inadequacies of Using an Anonymous Tip to Provide
Reasonable Suspicionfor an Investigatory Stop, 81 J. CRIMINOLOGY L. & CRIM. 760
(1991).
90. As the Court explained in White:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established
with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable
suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Adams v. Williams, [407 U.S. 143
(1972),] demonstrates as much. We there assumed that the unverified
tip from the known informant might not have been reliable enough to
establish probable cause, but nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable
to justify a Terry stop.... Both factors-quantity and quality-are considered in the "totality of the circumstances . . ." that must be taken

into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.
110 S. Ct. at 2416 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981))
(citation omitted).
91. Id. at 2417.
92. Id.
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to predict White's future behavior, i.e. the travel plans. 93 According to the Court, the correct prediction of itinerary (incomplete
though the itinerary was at the time of the stop) demonstrated
inside knowledge.9 4 Unlike the facts about the car, "the general
public would have had no way of knowing [White's future travel
plans]." 95 The Court said "it [is] reasonable for police to believe
that a person with access to [an individual's itinerary] is likely to
also have access to reliable information about that individual's illegal activities"-at least it is reasonable enough to support the
96
minimal, lesser standards of reasonable suspicion.
Justice Stevens wrote a short dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, in which he argued that the activity predicted by the informant and corroborated by the policeleaving an apartment and driving toward a motel-was completely innocent, and any prediction as to criminal activity was a
leap of faith. 97 Justice Stevens found it especially dangerous that
an anonymous informant, with the barest knowledge of a person's
innocent future activity, could generate a police intrusion. 98 After White, an officer can draw a reasonable inference that the tipster's actually false conclusion of criminal activity was in fact
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.

96. Id. In United States v. Campbell, 920 F.2d 793 (11 th Cir. 1991), the
court interpreted the facts of White as an absolute minimum showing of reasonable suspicion, so that cases similar to White would clearly not satisfy the more
rigorous standard of probable cause. Id. at 797. Campbell dealt with a tip that a
woman named "Yoli," accompanied by three armed Mexican males, would bring
marijuana to Montgomery in a white and green Chevrolet pickup truck with a
camper shell and Texas license plates and would arrive at a particular truck stop
between 11:30 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. Id. at 794. The police observed a truck
matching the description arrive at the place and time described, but, instead of
conducting an investigatory stop, they searched and arrested the occupants of
the truck. Id. At first, no marijuana was found. Id. Then the truck and defendants were taken to the police station. Id. The defendants were separated and
questioned, and the owner of the truck signed a consent to search the truck. Id.
A marijuana sniffing dog then detected marijuana in the truck. Id. The district
court held that under Gates the corroboration of the tip was sufficient for probable cause to search and arrest. Id. at 795. However, noting the similarity of the
facts to those of White (and noting that the Supreme Court acknowledged that
White was a "close case"), the Eleventh Circuit held that under White "the most
that the Montgomery police had (at the initial arrest and fruitless search] was a
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity." Id. at 797. Hence, the marijuana was
excluded as tainted by the illegal arrest. Id. at 797-98.
97. White, 110 S. Ct. at 2417-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Stevens recognized the
potential for abuse. For example, an unscrupulous police officer can seize and
question someone at will; if the officer discovers any contraband, he could claim
he was acting on an anonymous tip. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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reliable.09

2. Implications of White
White is a re-affirmation of Adams v. Williams,100 where the
Court found under the totality of the circumstances, a minimally
corroborated informant's tip sufficient to satisfy reasonable suspicion. Adams v. Williams was decided in the Spinelli era, however,
and White clears up any ambiguity as to how the lesser standards
of reasonable suspicion are to be evaluated under the totality of
circumstances approach. White holds that reasonable suspicion
can be found through anonymous tips. That question was left
open in Adams, which concerned a tip from an informant known
personally to the officer. 101
Still, White is a simple application of fact to law; no attempt is
made to evaluate the underlying premise of the usefulness of an
informant's tip. White relies blindly on the same premise as Adams-that because reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard of
proof, it can be met on a less reliable showing of proof. The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding as to both quantity
and quality of information. 10 2 Apparently, certain information
may be too unreliable to satisfy probable cause, but reliable
enough to satisfy reasonable suspicion. But the Court in White
did little or nothing to develop, explain or concretize this point
for lower court guidance.
After White, a very important form of corroboration will be
evidence showing an informant's substantially correct prediction
99. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted:
Millions of people leave their apartments at about the same time every
day carrying an attach6 case and heading for a destination known to
their neighbors. Usually, however, the neighbors do not know what the
briefcase contains. An anonymous neighbor's piediction about somebody's time of departure and probable destination is anything but a
reliable basis for assuming that the commuter is in possession of an
illegal substance-particularly when the person is not even carrying the
attach6 case described by the tipster.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
101. Id. at 146 (where informant is known to policeman and had provided
tips in past, there is "stronger case than ... in the case of an anonymous telephone tip").
102. For a criticism of the Adams reasoning, see The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 178 (1972) ("[T]he standard of cause to stop should
be less than probable cause only in the sense that the officer may stop on less or
different information than probable cause would require and not in the sense
that he may act on information that is received in a manner less reliable than
probable cause would require.").
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of future activity. 0 3 It need only be substantially correct, because
reasonable suspicion is such a minimal standard.1 0 4 Moreover,
the activity corroborated can be completely innocent, again because the minimal reasonable suspicion standard allows an inference to be drawn that an informant's prediction of innocent
activity makes it sufficiently likely that the prediction of criminal
activity is true.10 5 It should be noted that the central proposition
of White and Adam-that a prediction of innocent activity can create an inference that a conclusion concerning criminal activity is
reliable-is inconsistent with Justice White's concurring opinion
in Spinelli v. United States. 10 6 In Spinelli, Justice White argued that
an informant's correct prediction of innocent activity cannot cre103. See Minnesota v. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991). In Albrecht, the police received an anonymous tip stating that the defendant was a drug dealer. Id. at 108. The informant provided general directions to
defendant's house, and said that defendant had a red and white pickup truck. Id.
Further, the informant claimed to have personal knowledge of defendant's drug
use and drug selling. Id. The Albrecht court decided that this was insufficient to
establish the requisite probable cause required for a search warrant. Id. at 109.
The court said that the facts corroborated by the police-location of house and
defendant's ownership of a pick-up truck-were easily obtained facts. Id. Moreover, the court cited Alabama v. White as supporting the proposition that the
anonymous informant's ability to predict defendant's future behavior is significantly more probative than merely a recital of "easily obtained facts and conditions." Id.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.) (where
informant predicted defendant would be robbing certain banks, and defendant
was parked outside one of the banks, there was reasonable suspicion to make
investigatory stop, even though informant's description of car and license plate
were wrong), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 530 (1990).
105. See, e.g., Maryland v. Williams, 84 Md. App. 738, 581 A.2d 864 (1990).
In Williams, there were three tips, one from a reliable, confidential informant
predicting that a drug deal would take place at a certain location, naming some
of the participants, and describing the vehicle that would be driven, the second,
from an anonymous citizen, confirming the information in the first tip, and the
third, from the same anonymous citizen, stating that the location had been
changed. Id. at 740. At the location named in the third tip, police saw the vehicle described drive up, saw the driver get out of his car and run over to a woman
standing at the location of the predicted deal. Id. at 741. After speaking to her
the defendant ran back to his car. Id. No exchange or other illegal activity was
observed. Id. The police stopped the driver and searched the car. Id. The
court held that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the stop because the
anonymous citizen's first tip was corroborated by the fact that it was identical to
the reliable informant's tip, his second tip also gained reliability. Id. at 747-48.
The accurate prediction of the car at the location also corroborated the tip regarding the changed location. Id. at 748. And, significantly, the fact that the
predicted transaction did not take place did not dissipate the reasonable suspicion. Id. It was reasonable for the officer to believe that, although the deal was
for some reason aborted, there was contraband at the scene ready to be delivered. Id.
106. 393 U.S. 410, 427 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
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ate an inference that he is correct about criminal activity. 0 7
On the issue of corroboration and reliability, there is an inconsistency between the Supreme Court's fourth and sixth
amendment jurisprudence. In Idaho v. Wright,'08 the Court held
that corroboration was irrelevant to the reliability of a hearsay
statement under the confrontation clause.' 0 9 The Wright Court
reasoned that allowing corroborative evidence to be considered
would allow an unreliable statement to be bootstrapped into admissibility by the trustworthiness of other evidence.' 10 Yet when
considering the reliability of an informant's hearsay statement as
to probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the Court has found it
crucial that the police have corroborated the tip with independent
investigation. It is unclear why an informant's hearsay statement
can be considered reliable because corroborated, while that same
corroboration would be irrelevant to the reliability of a hearsay
statement offered at trial. Again, the Court has done little to explain or synthesize the various strands of its own jurisprudence.
It is busy applying discrete facts to discrete law.
AsJustice Stevens points out in his dissent, the majority's ruling in White allows officers to create anonymous informants to justify stops."'I However, it is not the decision in White that created
this possibility but rather the decisions in Adams and Gates, which
are applied mechanically in White.
C.

Rejection of the Inadvertence Requirementfor Plain View Seizures

1. Discussion of Horton v. California
Unlike most of its other ventures into criminal procedure, the
107. Id. (White, J., concurring). To illustrate his point, Justice White explains: "[Suppose] a reliable informant states there is gambling equipment in
Apartment 607 and then proceeds to describe in detail Apartment 201, a description which is verified before applying for the warrant. He was light about
201, but that hardly makes him more believable about the equipment in 607."
Id. (WhiteJ, concurring).
108. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
109. Id. at 3150. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor said: "To be
admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a
defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial." Id.
110. Id.
111. Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2418 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"[U]nder the court's holding, every citizen is subject to being seized and questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was
based on an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Court in Horton v. California112 reinvestigated the validity of prior

authority. Horton substantially changes the law on the exception
for plain view seizures. The warrant in Horton authorized the
seizure of the proceeds of a robbery." 3 The officer had probable
cause to believe that the weapons used in the robbery would be
found in the search, but he did not seek a warrant for the weapons, and the warrant he obtained therefore did not authorize their
seizure." 4 In the course of the search for the proceeds, the unsurprised officer saw the weapons in plain view.1 1 5 The state admitted that this discovery was not inadvertent." 16
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire," 7 a plurality of Warren Court
justices held that a seizure could not be justified under the plain
view doctrine unless it was "inadvertent."'1 8 In Horton, the
Supreme Court rejected the plurality view in Coolidge and held
that "even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate 'plain view' seizures, it is not a necessary condition.""19
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for seven members of the
Court. The majority began its discussion by restating the parameters of the plain view doctrine that are well accepted. First, the
doctrine authorizes warrantless seizures, but not warrantless
searches. 120 For instance, just because a briefcase is in plain view
does not mean it can be searched. But it can be seized under the
plain view doctrine if there is probable cause to believe it is or
contains evidence of criminal activity. The term "seizure" refers
to a deprivation of dominion or control over property while the
term "search" refers to an invasion of privacy.' 2 ' Justice Stevens
explained that the plain view justification for an exception to the
warrant requirement "is addressed to the concerns implicated by
22
seizures rather than by searches."'
Second, the plain view doctrine can apply to seizures in the
course of both warranted and warrantless searches.' 23 However,
"the officer must be lawfully located in a place from which the
112. 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
113. Id. at 2304.
114. Id.

115. Id. at 2304-05.
116. Id.
117. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
118. Id. at 469.
119. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304.

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 2306.
Id.
Id
Id. at 2307.
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object can be plainly seen, [and] ...must also have a lawful right

of access to the object."' 24 So even though an officer sees contraband through a house window, he is not allowed to enter the
house to seize it, unless there is an independent lawful means of
25
access into the house.'
Third, probable cause to seize the item must be immediately
apparent. 26 If the item must be searched and investigated in order to determine whether there is probable cause to seize it, such
an investigation is itself a search which requires probable
cause.' 27 After setting forth these basic principles of the plain
view doctrine, Justice Stevens turned to Coolidge's inadvertence
requirement. He took pains not to "overrule" Coolidge, and rejected the proposition that a plurality opinion is not entitled to
stare decisis effect.' 28 Justice Stevens contended instead that
while Coolidge was a "binding precedent," the discussion of inadvertence in the plurality opinion was not necessary to the decision.' 29 Rather, the decision was based primarily on the fact that
probable cause to seize Coolidge's car was not immediately apparent-its "probative value remained uncertain until the interior
w[as] swept and examined microscopically."'' 30 At best, however,
the Coolidge plurality's holding that probable cause was not immediately apparent was an alternative holding, entitled to equal
weight with the holding that the seizure was not inadvertent.' 3 '
Justice Stevens' painful and unpersuasive attempt to rewrite the
holding in Coolidge is indicative of the Burger-Rehnquist Court's
attempt to tinker here and there, but to avoid confronting a prior
decision head-on.
On the merits, however, Justice Stevens conducted a vigorous analysis of the policies behind the inadvertence requirement.
The Court in Horton found the inadvertence requirement to be
unsound on two grounds. First, the standard of inadvertence was
impermissibly subjective.' 32 It invalidated the seizure based on
the state of mind of the officer, which had little to do with fourth
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 2308.
SeeJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2308.
See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 376 (1987).
Horton, 110 S.Ct. at 2307.
Id. at 2305, 2308 n.2.

130. Id. at 2308.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 2307.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/1

22

Capra: Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: Fourth and Fifth Amendment

1991]

PRISONERS OF THEIR OWN JURISPRUDENCE

1289

amendment standards of reasonableness.' 3 3 It could be argued
in response that the inadvertence requirement did not depend on
a subjective state of mind, but rather on pre-existing probable
cause-that is, if the officer had probable cause to seize an item
before obtaining a warrant, and failed to include that item in the
warrant application, then the subsequent discovery of the item
could not be inadvertent. Yet this objective pre-existing probable
cause standard has its own problems. For one thing, it has the
strange effect of turning an adversarial argument on its head: the
defendant must argue that there was pre-existing probable cause
to seize an item, while the state must argue that there was not.
Moreover, if there is pre-existing probable cause to seize an
item, there seems to be little reason for the officer to exclude it
from the warrant application. Inclusion can only increase the
scope and intensity of the warranted search. The majority in Hor34
ton recognized and emphasized this point.'
As a second ground, the Court found unpersuasive Justice
Stewart's reasoning in Coolidge that an inadvertence requirement
was necessary to prevent warrantless general searches. 3 5 Justice
Stevens reasoned that an inadvertence requirement would do
nothing to reduce the scope of a search or the number of places
in which the officer may look. 13 6 In order to trigger the plain view
doctrine, the officer must be in a lawful place to find the items
that are described in a warrant or in the proper scope of warrantless activity.' 3 7 So rejecting the inadvertence requirement would
not allow the officer to look in any more places or with any more
intensity than he would otherwise be able to do.' 3 8 In fact, the
officer would want to include all seizable materials in a warrant,
133. Id- at 2308-09. Specifically, Justice Stevens opined: "[E]venhanded
law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of
conduct, rather than standards that depend on the subjective state of mind of
the officer." Id.; see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (evaluation
of fourth amendment violations should be based on reasonableness, not subjective bad faith of officer).
134. 110 S. Ct. at 2309. Justice Stevens noted:
If the officer has knowledge approaching certainty that the item will be
found, we see no reason why he or she would deliberately omit a particular description of the item to be seized from the application for a
search warrant. Specification of the additional item could only permit

the officer to expand the scope of the search.

Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2309-10.
138. Id
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since that could serve to expand the scope of a lawful search.'8 9
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. Justice Brennan noted that the inadvertence requirement had become widely accepted, with no apparent deleterious effect on law
40
enforcement.
Justice Brennan also argued that the inadvertence requirement was necessary to guarantee that a warrant describe the
things to be seized.' 4 1 Otherwise, an officer could deliberately
omit certain items from the warrant application, secure in the
knowledge that they would be found in plain view.142 Essentially,
Justice Brennan thought that the warrant process would be made
too easy if the officer only had to justify the seizure of one item as
opposed to many. 143 This concern is unfounded, however. Even
if the magistrate finds no probable cause to include an item in the
warrant, there will still be probable cause to seize that item if
found in plain view during a warranted search. Thus, making the
warrant process "harder" will not prevent warrantless seizures
under the plain view doctrine.
Justice Brennan also contended that the inadvertence requirement was necessary because otherwise the officer, rather
than the magistrate, will determine whether there is probable
cause to seize an item.' 44 According to Justice Brennan, the majority was asking the wrong question. 45 The inadvertence requirement was never intended to limit general searches, rather it
139. In a case dealing with a plain view seizure in a warrantless situation, a
New York Court rejected Horton under state law and held that evidence seized in
a purposeful visual search of the interior of an occupied automobile without
cause was not admissible under the plain view doctrine. The court held that
a police officer in New York may not purposefully conduct a visual
search of the interior of an occupied automobile without some objective credible reason justifying police interest in the vehicle. Although
the reason need not necessarily be indicative of criminality, it may not

be the product of an intent to harass nor may it be based upon mere

whim, caprice or idle curiosity.
People v. Manganaro, 148 Misc. 2d 616, 624, 561 N.Y.S.2d 379, 385 (Sup. Ct.
1990).
140. See Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2314-15 app. A (Brennan,J., dissenting) (listing states that have adopted inadvertent discovery requirement); id. at 2315-16
app. B (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing federal courts of appeals that have
adopted inadvertent discovery requirement).
141. Id. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (fourth amendment requires war-

rant "particularly describe ... things to be seized").
142. l (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2312-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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was intended to limit wholesale warrantless seizures. 46 While
the inadvertence requirement does not limit the scope of a
search, it does limit the scope of a seizure. 47 But again, a prior
denial by a magistrate of a warrant to seize a certain item does not
preclude its later warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine. There is little utility and a good deal of mischief in the inadvertence requirement.
2.

Implications of Horton

Horton is an admirable return to first principles. In Horton,
the Court refused to allow its own jurisprudence to paint it into a
comer. The virtues of a true investigation of precedent are
clear-an unnecessary, burdensome and confusing legal doctrine
may be eradicated. It is unlikely that this would have occurred,
however, if the Court had to meet Coolidge head-on. The result in
Horton was only possible because the majority could argue, without being too uncomfortable, that the inadvertence requirement
was dictum in Coolidge.
Now, if there is probable cause to seize the items listed in the
warrant, all items within plain view while the search is being conducted are seizable upon probable cause-even if the officer expected to find them there, had probable cause, and deliberately
48
bypassed the magistrate.
D.

Third Party Consent and Apparent Authority

1. Discussion of Illinois v. Rodriguez
In Illinois v. Rodriguez,' 4 9 the Court considered the issue it left
open in United States v. Matlock,' 50 and decided it in a very predictable way. In Matlock, the Court held that a warrantless entry and
search of the defendant's property does not violate the fourth
amendment where the officers obtain voluntary consent from a
third party with common authority over the premises. The Court
in Matlock found it unnecessary to determine whether a search is
valid when based on the consent of a third party who has appar146. Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting).

147. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. See Note, Fourth Amendment-Eliminatingthe Inadvertent Discovery Require-

ment for Seizures Under the Plain View Doctrine, 81 J. CRIMINOLOcY L. & GRIM. 819
(1991) (Hortonabolished inadvertency requirement of plain view doctrine to better serve the interests of law enforcement).
149. 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
150. 4-15 U.S. 164 (1974).
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ent but not actual authority over the premises. 1 5 l
The third party in Rodriguez was Rodriguez's woman friend,
who had, unknown to the officers, moved out of his apartment a
month before the search and retained a key without permission.' 52 When speaking to the officers, she referred to the prem'5
ises as "our apartment."'
Justice Scalia, writing for a six-person majority, agreed with
the lower courts that the friend did not have actual authority to
consent to a search of the apartment, in that she had no joint access or control of the premises after moving out.' 54 According to
the majority, however, the officers' reasonable belief that the
friend had authority to consent would validate the entry. 55
Rodriguez argued that if a reasonable belief of common authority could validate a search, the third party would in effect be
making an unauthorized waiver of defendant's fourth amendment
rights.' 5 6 As Justice Scalia noted, this argument confused the
standard of waiver of constitutional rights with the standard for
voluntary consent to searches established by Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.' 57 In Bustamonte, the Court held that a defendant could
voluntarily consent to a search, even though he did not know that
he had a right to refuse.' 58 Following Bustamonte, Justice Scalia
explained, while a waiver of a constitutional right must be personal, the validity of a consent search is determined by whether
the search is reasonable.15 9 Consent does not constitute a waiver
of fourth amendment rights, but rather satisfies the fourth
151. Id. at 177.
152. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2798.
153. Id. at 2797.
154. Id. at 2797-98.
155. Id. at 2797 ("The burden of establishing... common authority rests
upon the State. On the basis of this record, it is clear that burden was not
sustained.").
156. Id. at 2798-99. Specifically, Justice Scalia argues that there is a significant distinction between waiving "trial" rights and waiving "constitutional"
rights in terms of the standard of scrutiny. Id.
157. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
158. Id. at 224-25.
159. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2799. Justice Scalia argued:
We would assuredly not permit ...

evidence seized in violation of the

Fourth Amendment to be introduced on the basis of a trial court's mere
"reasonable belief"-derived from statements by unauthorized persons-that the defendant has waived his objection. But one must make
a distinction between, on the one hand, trial rights that derive from the
violation of constitutional guarantees and, on the other hand, the na-

ture of those constitutional guarantees themselves.
Id. at 2798.
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amendment requirement that a search be reasonable; it is reasonable because there is voluntary consent. 60 Because all that is required by Bustamonte is reasonableness, it follows ineluctably that
the officers who obtain consent from a third party are entitled to
make reasonable mistakes concerning that party's authority to
16
consent. The fourth amendment does not require perfection. '
Justice Scalia concluded that the question of authority to consent should be governed by the same standard of reasonableness-and allowance for reasonable mistakes-as had been
applied in other areas of fourth amendment jurisprudence, such
as probable cause, the execution of a warrant, and the existence
of exigent circumstances. 162 According to the Court, it would be
anomalous to allow for a reasonable mistake of fact to support
probable cause or exigent circumstances, but not to allow for
such a mistake to determine consent. 63 All these cases are gov-

erned by the fourth amendment's requirement that searches must
be reasonable.
One problem forJustice Scalia was the Warren Court case of
Stoner v. California,1 '4 where the Court held that a hotel desk clerk
could not validly consent to the warrantless search of the defendant's hotel room.' 6 5 The Stoner Court had stated broadly that
"the rights protected by the fourth amendment are not to be
160. Id. Justice Scalia said:
What Rodriguez is assured by the trial right of the exclusionary
rule, where it applies, is that no evidence seized in violation of the

Fourth Amendment will be introduced at his trial unless he consents.
What he is assured by the Fourth Amendment itself, however, is not
that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents;
but that no such search will occur that is "unreasonable." There are
various elements, of course, that can make a search of a person's house
"reasonable"-one of which is the consent of the person or his
cotenant.
Id. at 2799 (citation omitted).
161. Id. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the majority said, "The essence of respondent's argument is that we should impose upon this element a
requirement that we have not imposed upon other elements that regularly compel government officers to exercise judgment regarding the facts: namely, the
requirement that their judgment be not only responsible but correct." Id.
162. Id at 2800. Such, Justice Scalia explains, is "the cost of living in a safe
society." Id.; see also Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971) ("[Wlhen police
have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a
second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid
arrest." (quoting California v. Hill, 446 P.2d 521, 523 (1968), aff'd 401 U.S. 797
(1971))).
163. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2800.
164. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
165. Id. at 489.
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eroded . . . by unrealistic doctrines of (apparent authority.)" 1 66

Justice Scalia did not attack Stoner head on, even though he is
clearly the most likely member of the current Court to have done
So. 167 Justice Scalia determined that the message of Stoner was
ambiguous enough that the question of apparent authority had
been left open in that case.168
Unlike Justice Stevens' attempt to downplay Coolidge in the
Horton case, Justice Scalia's avoidance of Stoner is principled and
persuasive. Stoner is not really an apparent authority case.' 69 In
Stoner, there was no factual error that the officers made. 70 The
officers knew that the third party was a desk clerk and that the
room was rented.' 7 ' They could not have reasonably believed
that the clerk had the authority to allow entry into the room. 72
In essence, the officers in Stoner made a mistake of law, and not a
mistake of fact. A mistake of law does not come within the apparent authority doctrine, as the Court in both Stoner and Rodriguez
recognized. 73
The Court in Rodriguez remanded for a determination of
whether the officers could have reasonably believed that Rodriguez's friend had actual authority to consent to a search of his
apartment. 74 In his dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and StevensJustice Marshall contended that third party consent searches
are permissible not because they are reasonable, but because a
166. Id. at 488.
167. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3058 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In Walton, Justice Scalia explicitly rejected the Court's opinion in
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3064-65 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). See also Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486,497 (1990) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting) (rejecting majority's reliance on Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981), as "prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis, producing a veritable fairyland
castle of imagined constitutional restriction").
168. Rodiguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2800-01.
169. Id.
170. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 485-88.
171. Id.
172. Rodriguez, 110 S.Ct. at 2801.
173. See 3 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3(g), at 266 (2d ed. 1987).
174. 110 S. Ct. at 2801-02. Under this objective standard, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Englebrecht, 917 F.2d 376, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1120 (1991), upheld as reasonable a search where "an individual who had been living in the same farmhouse with, as well as working for,
Englebrecht consented to the search of the vehicles, which were parked near the
farmhouse." Id.; see also United States v. McAlpine, 919 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir.
1990) (police could have reasonably believed that woman who reported that she
was being held against her will by two men who had been sexually assaulting her
was qualified to give effective consent to search of entire trailer where she had
been held or resided for two months).
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person "may voluntarily limit his expectation of privacy by allowing others to exercise authority over his possessions" and thus
they are not searches at all.' 75 Justice Marshall concluded that if
an individual did not actually voluntarily assume the risk of third
party consent, there would then be a "search" and the consent of
a third party would not make the search reasonable.1 76 According
to the dissenters, the fact that a person "who allows another joint
access over his property thereby limits his expectation of privacy
does not justify trampling the rights of a person who has not simi17 7
larly relinquished any of his privacy expectation."'
2.

Implications of Rodriguez

Rodriguez makes clear that a consent search is not a waiver of
fourth amendment rights but rather a reasonable search permitted by the fourth amendment.' 78 Yet this was already clear from
Bustamonte, where an unknowing consent could not possibly have
been justified as a waiver of a constitutional right. Rodriguez is
thus typical of current Rehnquist Court criminal procedurejurisprudence-it re-affirms, it applies established jurisprudence to
facts which differ only slightly from prior cases. It does what
lower courts do every day. Notably, the Court did not revisit the
very questionable assumption of the Bustamonte Court-that a voluntary but not knowing consent leads to a reasonable search.
Why is that reasonable? Why is the reasonableness clause even
applicable to a search for law enforcement purposes? The Court
never bothers to consider fundamental issues; it is satisfied to
have decided the case before it.
The Court in Rodriguez stressed that the police could not presume third party consent merely upon the assertion of the third
party that he has common authority. 179 The surrounding circumstances could be such that a reasonable person would doubt the
truth of such an assertion.18 0
175. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2802 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. Id.at 2804 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Marshall asserts that "[t]his conclusion flows directly from Stoner v. California." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2801.
179. Id. The Court noted: "[W]hat we hold today does not suggest that
law enforcement officers may always accept a person's invitation to enter premises." Id.
180. Id.; see, e.g., Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L.
REv. 47, 63 (1974) (babysitter's assertions that she has common authority over
premises are not deserving of unquestioned acceptance, because it is contrary to

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 1

1296

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36: p. 1267

Rodriguez does not change the presumption in the lower
courts that police officers must make reasonable inquiries as to
apparent authority when they find themselves in ambiguous circumstances. Of course, officers do not have to check the legal
title of every house. But if the -facts cry out for further inquiry,
and more facts are reasonably available, then a duty of inquiry
will be imposed under the fourth amendment standard of
reasonableness.'18
Because the issue is reasonableness and not waiver, the Rodriguez analysis should probably change the result in certain courts
that have held that police may not obtain third-party consent
when the defendant is on the premises and refuses to consent to
the search. 18 2 Even where the defendant is present and objecting,
the consent of a third party with common authority is likely to be
found "reasonable"-the absence of a personal waiver (indeed
the presence of a personal objection) is not controlling.1 8 3
After Rodriguez a third party consent search can be supported
by either actual or apparent authority. The Rodriguez fact situation concerns apparent but not actual authority. But a consent
search would be equally reasonable if based upon actual but not
apparent authority--that is, the officers could not reasonably believe that the chauffeur had the run of the mansion, but in fact he
did.18 4
E.

Reasonableness of a Protective Sweep for Self-Protection
1. Discussion of Maryland v. Buie
A "protective sweep" is a quick and limited search of a premcommon understanding for a babysitter to be permitted to admit police for a
search while parents are out).
181. Compare United States v. Poole, 307 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. La. 1969)
(duty to inquire whether some of the property searched was owned by person
giving consent) with People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 422 N.E.2d 537, 439
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1981) (duty of further inquiry excused given exigencies of situation in which consent was given and search was made).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984)
(third party consent ineffective where defendant is present and objecting).
183. Compare People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 290-91, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652,
654, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1322-23 (1979) (search is reasonable upon third party
consent even though defendant is present and objecting) with United States v.
Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981) (though defendant had previously refused
consent, his wife could still consent to search where she had common authority;
defendant was not on premises at time of search).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (7th Cir.
1990) (while it was unreasonable to infer apparent authority when person consenting to search said that she did not live in house and was only there to do
laundry; fact that she had actual authority justified search).
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ises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of
police officers or others. 8 5 In Maryland v. Buie,'1 6 following an
armed robbery, police obtained arrest warrants for Buie and his
accomplice and went to Buie's house.18 7 Buie was arrested upon
emerging from the basement.188 The officers did a cursory search
of the basement to see if anyone else was there, and in the course
of that search, they found incriminating evidence in plain view.18 9
Buie argued that police could not conduct such a sweep in
the absence of probable cause to believe that there were individuals on the premises who would harm the officers or others.190
The Court, by a 7-2 vote, rejected his argument, and held that a
protective sweep could be conducted on reasonable suspicion of
bodily harm to the officers or to others.19 1 In doing so, the Court
simply applied established jurisprudence following from Terry v.
Ohio.' 92 Terry and its progeny allow cursory inspections upon reasonable suspicion, when necessary to protect police officers.' 9 3
Justice White, writing for the majority, relied most heavily on
Terry itself and on Michigan v. Long 194 which held that in the
course of a stop, officers could search accessible areas of an automobile for a weapon upon reasonable suspicion of bodily
harm.' 95 Thus, Long extended the permissible scope of a Terry
frisk for self-protection beyond the suspect's person.' 9 6
According to Justice White, the reasonable suspicion standard was an appropriate balance between the arrestee's remaining privacy interest in the home and the officer's interest in
safety. 197 The Court noted that while even a cursory inspection
of a home was a severe intrusion, the state has a heavy interest in
protecting officers who are in the course of making an arrest.' 9 8
185. Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1099 (1990) (protective sweep may
only extend to cursory inspection of those spaces where person may be found).
186. 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990).
187. Id. at 1095.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1095-96.
191. Id. at 1099-2000.
192. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
193. Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1101 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
195. Id. at 1049-50.
196. Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1097. In Buie, Justice White explained that Long

authorized an automobile "frisk." Id
197. Id. at 1098.
198. Id. (rejecting state's contention that cursory inspection constituted de
minimus intrusion); see also United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1991).
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This balancing process, and the inevitable state-affirming outcome of the balancing, are straight out of Terry. Various members
of the Warren Court have decried the Burger-Rehnquist Court's
use of Terry to open up a generalized balancing approach to the
fourth amendment. In Buie itself, Justice Brennan, joined byJustice Marshall, dissented and noted his continuing criticism "of the
emerging tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Terry
decision from a narrow exception into one that swallows the general rule that searches are 'reasonable' only if based upon probable cause."' 199 However, the open-ended invitation to balancing
is clearly present in Terry, as Justice Douglas recognized in his
dissent in that case. 200 Thus, the Burger-Rehnquist Court is not
rejecting Warren Court precedent so much as exploiting it.
If balancing is the fourth amendment benchmark, one wonders how the Court justifies its adherence to probable cause for a
search in Arizona v. Hicks.20 1 There, the Court specifically rejected
a balancing approach, and held that "a search is a search. ' 20 2 In
Buie, Justice White distinguished Hicks as involving a search for
evidence, rather than a search for safety purposes as in Terry and
Long. 203 In line with the roadblock seizure case of Sitz, 20 4 the
Court has drawn a constitutional distinction between a search for
protection, which can be justified by reasonable suspicion, and a
search for evidence for law enforcement purposes, which requires
probable cause.
One may also wonder how the protective sweep pursuant to
In Flippin, the Ninth Circuit considered the seizure and search of a make-up bag
following not an arrest, but an entry with defendant's consent into her motel
room. Flippin, 924 F.2d at 164. There was neither probable cause to enter the
motel room, nor to search it or the defendant. Id. at 165. However, when the
officer turned his back, the defendant grabbed a bag and refused to relinquish it.
Id. at 164. Fearing the defendant was attempting to arm herself, the officer forcibly took the bag from her and opened it. Id. The Ninth Circuit upheld the
search, rejecting the argument that Buie required an initial entry with arrest warrant and probable cause or exigent circumstances, before a protective search in
the home could occur. Id. at 165. The Court held that the opening of the bag
was justified as well as the seizure, because the officer's seizure of it did not
dissipate the danger. Id. at 167. The Court reasoned that by struggling to retain
possession of the bag, the defendant made it reasonable to suspect she might
use force to regain possession of it. Id.
199. Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1101 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (Douglas,J., dissenting) (warning
that majority decision would have effect of embarking society on "totalitarian
path").

201. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
202. Id. at 325.
203. Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1096-97.
204. For a discussion of Sitz, see supra notes 9-43 and accompanying text.
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an arrest can be squared with the spatial limitations imposed on
searches incident to arrest in Chimel v. California.20 5 In Chimel, the
Court held that the scope of a search incident to arrest was limited to the grab area of the arrestee; 2 0 6 the sweep in Buie obviously went beyond the grab area. The majority in Buie contended
that the spatial limitations of Chimel were not undermined by allowing a protective sweep on reasonable suspicion, since one had
nothing to do with the other.20 7 Specifically, the Court said that
unlike a search incident to arrest, the protective sweep is limited
to areas where persons may be hidden; it does not allow the police to thoroughly search an area beyond the grab area incident to
arrest, as does Chimel.2 °8 Moreover, unlike a search incident to
arrest, a protective sweep is not an automatic right of the officer;
20 9
it is allowed only upon reasonable suspicion of bodily harm.
205. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
206. Id. at 763. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart said that incident
to an arrest a police officer is justified in searching "the arrestee's person and
the area 'within his immediate control'--construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. Conversely, the officer would not be justified in searching any area
beyond the arrestee's immediate control in the absence of a search warrant. Id.
207. Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1099.
208. Id.
209. Id. The Sixth Circuit applied Buie in United States v. Akrawi, 920 F.2d
418 (6th Cir. 1990), and found a protective sweep improper because the agents
conducting the sweep "could point to no particular reason to support a reasonable belief that the second floor harbored a dangerous individual. Furthermore,
the government has failed to show that the sweep was quick, and occurred at the
time of or promptly after the arrest." Id at 421. Here, the court was persuaded
by the fact that after the defendant was arrested, the "agents inexplicably remained in the house for forty-five minutes." Id. at 419. Likewise, after a proper
protective sweep has determined that no one else is in the premises, continued
presence or reentry without a warrant is illegal. See United States v. Oguns, 921

F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1990).
In United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1990), sheriffs went to
the defendant's mobile home to execute an arrest warrant. Id at 1096. The
defendant was in violation of his parole and had a history of firearm violations.
Id. at 1097. The sheriffs knocked on the door of the mobile home and announced themselves. Id. at 1096. While defendant's wife let a sheriff in the
front door, the defendant jumped out of a back window to escape. Id. Four
sheriffs chased after the defendant. Id. The fifth sheriff was standing in the
trailer with defendant's wife when he heard gunshots. Id. He did not know who
was shooting at whom. Id. He immediately engaged in a protective search of
the trailer and discovered three loaded firearms and contraband. Id. at 1096-97.
The court held that under these circumstances, the sheriff's protective sweep
was fullyjustified. Id. at 1097. It reasoned that "[g]iven defendant's actions and
background, it was not unreasonable for [the sheriff in the trailer] to believe that
other dangerous people would be present or that defendant would return." Id.
In United States v. Oguns, the defendant was arrested while standing
outside his apartment. 921 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1990). Noticing defendant's
door was open, the police entered and conducted a protective search. Id. Up-
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Therefore, the Court concludes, allowance for a protective sweep
does not render meaningless the search incident to arrest doctrine, as to which the spatial limitations on Chimel are retained.
Chimel still prohibits routine, automatic searches of the area beyond the arrestee's reach, and Buie is consistent with that
210
prohibition.
Justice Stevens concurred to emphasize that a protective
sweep could only be conducted to protect police officers, not to
prevent the destruction of evidence. 21 1 Justice Stevens' concurrence is consistent with the majority's reliance on Terry. A Terry
frisk, of which the protective sweep is just an example, can only
be supported by interests in self-protection; it cannot be used to
search for evidence. 21 2 Otherwise there would be nothing left of
the Court's probable cause requirement in Hicks.
2.

Implications of Buie

Buie is another of the cases in the 1989-90 term that is a simple application of fact to law that most lower courts had already
resolved. It is hardly a step from Long to Buie.21 3 In both cases,
the self-protection rationale of Terry is fairly applied to an area
beyond the suspect's person. But again, the Court does nothing
to justify the worth of the underlying precedent itself.
In Buie, the defendant was arrested in the home. Could a
protective sweep be conducted if the arrest was made just outside
the home? Presuming a reasonable fear of bodily harm from
someone within the house, courts both before and after Buie have
21 4
answered in the affirmative.
holding the search, the court explained that "[h]ad third parties been in the
apartment, they would likely have been able to hear through the open door the
agents arresting [the defendant] and, with that knowledge, would have posed a
threat to the police outside." Id. at 447.
210. Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1097. Justice Brennan, however, found dubious
"the Court's implicit assumption ... that arrestees are likely to sprinkle hidden
allies throughout rooms in which they might be arrested." Id. at 1103 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1100 (Stevens, J., concurring).
212. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (search for evidence on
reasonable suspicion is not allowed by Terry).
213. See Note, Fourth Amendment-Protective Sweep Doctrine: When Does the
Fourth Amendment Allow Police Officers to Search the Home Incident to a Lawful Arrest?

81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 862 (1990) (Buie, like Long, rejects contention that
Terry limited to searches of detained individual).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hoyos,
868 F.2d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989) ("If the exigencies to support a protective
sweep exist, whether the arrest occurred inside or outside the residence does
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While the Court in Buie allows a search on less than probable
cause, the search remains within the justification of protection of
the officer.21 5 It is not a search for evidence qua evidence. The
absolute probable cause requirement for searches by law enforcement officers for evidence is specifically retained by the Court's
reference to Hicks. 216 Accordingly, a protective sweep to neutralize evidence-destroyers-as opposed to officer-destroyers-should
not be permissible after Hicks and Buie. Buie expressly justifies
protective sweeps as searches for those "posing a danger to those
on the arrest scene." 21 7 Some circuits before Buie had allowed
protective sweeps to protect evidence. 218 The rule in these circuits should be changed after Buie.219 Most courts, even before
Buie, allowed protective sweeps only for safety purposes, not to
220
uncover evidence-destroyers.
Finally, it should be noted that while the Court has drawn a
line between a search for self-protection which is permissible
upon reasonable suspicion and a search for evidence which must
be supported by probable cause, this line easily erodes where the
crime investigated is one of violence, such as drug crimes are considered today. For example, in United States v. Chaidez,221 the officer had reasonable suspicion that a driver was involved in a drug
transaction. 222 In most courts, as in Chaidez, drug distribution
gives per se reasonable suspicion of bodily harm, because the
not affect the reasonableness of the officer's conduct. A bullet fired at an arresting officer standing outside a window is as deadly as one that is projected from
one room to another."), cert. denied, 11 S. Ct. 80 (1990); Kirkpatrick v. Butler,
870 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1989) (reasonable grounds existed for security sweep of
premises even though defendant was arrested in doorway; factors included
proximity of cohort's apartment, suspicious behavior of defendant's girlfriend
when she answered the door, noise in back of apartment that girlfriend pretended not to hear, and defendant's attempt to retreat into premises upon the
arrest), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990); McGeehan v. Wainright, 526 F.2d 397
(5th Cir.) (although arrest made outside trailer, protective sweep of inside was
permissible given the risk of harm to arresting officers), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997
(1976).
215. Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1099-1100.
216. Id. at 1096.
217. Id. at 1100.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Escobar, 805 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1986) (pro-

tective sweep allowed upon reasonable fear of persons who "are likely to destroy
evidence").
219. However, a recent Second Circuit case misreads Buie as consistent with

its rule that a reasonable belief that others were in the house and "might destroy
evidence, escape orjeopardize the safety.of the officers or the public," justifies a
protective sweep. See United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 446 (2d Cir. 1990).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1983).
221. 906 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1990).
222. Id. at 384. The court said that "the torn backing, the loose or missing
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courts believe that drug dealers are almost always armed. 223
Therefore, the Court concludes, reasonable suspicion of a drug
transaction allowed the officer to search the accessible areas of
the passenger compartment of the car, pursuant to Long.224 During this inspection, the officer found a brick shaped object with a
white residue. 225 Chaidez clearly demonstrates how an illegal
search for evidence can survive judicial scrutiny through the Terry
back door.
F. Police Discretion in Inventory Searches
1. Discussion of Florida v. Wells
In Florida v. Wells, 2 26 a Florida Highway Trooper arrested

Wells for drunk driving. 227 The trooper impounded the car, and
conducted an inventory search. 228 Marijuana cigarettes were
found in the ashtray, and marijuana was found in a locked suitcase
in the trunk. 229 The record contained no evidence of any standard Highway Patrol policy concerning the opening of closed
2 30
containers found during inventory searches.
The lower court, relying on some language in Colorado v. Bertine,23 1 held that an inventory of closed containers is only permissible where police standards take all discretion away from the
officer who conducts the inventory.23 2 In other words, the lower
court read Bertine as mandating standards that either all containers must be opened in an inventory search, or that none can
be. 23

3

The Supreme Court unanimously found that the opening of a
locked suitcase could not be justified as an inventory search
where the Florida Highway Patrol had no policy whatever concerning the opening of closed containers. 23 4 ChiefJustice Rehnscrews, and the raised seat could have provided a reasonable suspicion that the
car contained drugs." Id.
223. Id. ("[G]uns are considered essential tools of the drug trade.").
224. Id. at 384.
225. Id. at 379.
226. 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990).
227. Id. at 1634.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.

231. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
232. Wells, 110 S.Ct. at 1635.
233. State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464, 469 (Fla. 1989).
234. Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635; id. (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 1638
(Blackmun, J., concurring); it at 1639 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Seventh
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quist, writing for the Court, found the search insufficiently
regulated and subject to arbitrariness.2 3 5 On this issue, there
could not have been an easier Supreme Court case in the last ten
years. In several prior cases, the Court had emphasized that an
inventory search could only be permitted if the officer's discretion
2 36
were controlled by department guidelines.
The import of Wells is that the Chief Justice went out of his
way to take issue with the Florida court's reading of Bertine as
prohibiting officers from exercising any discretion in opening
containers.2 37 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the fourth
amendment does allow the officer some limited latitude to decide
238
whether a container may be opened in an inventory search.
This discretion can be exercised "in light of the nature of the
search and the characteristics of the container itself."2 39 As an
example of appropriately limited discretion, the Chief Justice
stated that it would be permissible to allow the opening of closed
containers when the officer is unable to determine their contents
from an exterior inspection.2 40 Exercising discretion to open a
container in such circumstances is consistent with the three interests supporting the inventory search: 1) preservation of property;
2) protection of officers from false claims; and 3) protection from
bodily harm.2 4 ' The Chief Justice concluded that "[t]he allowance of the exercise ofjudgment based on concerns related to the
purposes of an inventory search does not violate the Fourth
2 42
Amendment."
This dictum prompted sharp responses in opinions by Justice
Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall), Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens, all of whom concurred in the judgment. These JusCircuit recently considered the question of whether an unwritten policy of opening all containers in an inventory search passed muster under Wells and held that
it did. See United States v. Kordosky, 921 F.2d 722, 724 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 94 (1991)).
235. Wells, 110 S.Ct. at 1635.
236. For a discussion of these cases, see 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 173, §
7.4(a), at 98-116.

237. See Wells, 110 S.Ct. at 1639 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("One must wonder why this case merited a grant of certiorari. The judgment of the Florida
Supreme Court was obviously correct.").

238.
239.
240.
241.

Id at 1635.
Id.
Id.
Id. These three interests support the view that the inventory search is

reasonable. These interests were previously articulated by the Court in South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
242. Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

37

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 1

1304

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36: p. 1267

tices argued that to allow the individual officer any discretion in
determining whether a container should be opened would create
an unacceptable risk of abuse. Justice Brennan noted that the Bertine Court had allowed the officer some discretion as to whether to
impound a car, but no discretion as to whether to open a
container therein. 243 He concluded that "[aittempting to cast
doubt on the vitality of the holding in Bertine in this otherwise easy
case is not justified. '244
2. Implications of Wells
The dictum in Wells does not even rise to the level of misapplication of precedent performed by the Burger Court. A strict
reading of Bertine indicates that the majority did not preclude all
discretion in the opening of containers. The majority recognized
the lower court's finding that the regulations at issue required
opening, but the majority did not specifically hold that opening
the containers was a constitutional requirement.245 Certainly, the
example of permissible discretion given in Wells is tame and is
more protective of privacy interests than an "all-or-nothing" requirement. Allowing the officer discretion to open containers
whose contents are not evident from an exterior inspection, leaving other containers closed, creates little risk of abuse.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
pointed out in United States v. Judge,24 6 it is impossible to eliminate

all exercise of discretion in an inventory search, given the variety
and variability of issues that arise. For example, even with an
"all-or-nothing" approach to opening containers, discretion
would often have to be exercised to determine whether a certain
item is in fact a container. The rule of thumb used inJudge, distinguishing between "administrative" discretion which is permissible, and "evidentiary" discretion, which is not, is still subject to
abuse, because decisions can be justified as administrative which
in fact are evidentiary. 247
Imposing rigid controls on discretion, which will be ineffective at any rate, makes little sense. Police regulations can be
somewhat flexible as to opening closed containers after Wells, as
243. Id. at 1636 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).

244. Id. at 1638 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
245. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 370 (1987).
246. 864 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1946

(1990).
247. Id. at 1147.
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they no doubt were before Wells. A mandatory opening rule is

certainly sufficient, but not required. An example of a policy that
will probably pass constitutional muster after Wells is one which
allows the opening of containers when they appear to contain valuable personal property. This implicates one of the concerns that
supports an inventory search, and setting forth a factual standard
for determining whether valuables appear to be present seems a
sufficient control upon discretion.
G.

WarrantlessArrest of an Overnight Guest is Illegal in Absence of
Exigent Circumstances

1. Discussion of Minnesota v. Olson
Minnesota v. Olson 248 deals with a previously unresolved issue
of standing-whether an overnight guest has standing to object to
his own warrantless arrest. The Court's mechanistic resolution of
the issue is indicative of its status as a jurisprudential prisoner.
Probable cause existed to arrest Olson. There was also probable cause to believe that Olson was located in the home of a
friend where he had been staying. Without a warrant, the police
entered the friend's home, found Olson and arrested him. Less
than an hour after his arrest, Olson made an inculpatory statement. 24 9 In Payton v. New York, 2 50 the Court held that a warrantless arrest of a person in his home was illegal in the absence of
exigent circumstances. It would appear, therefore, that if Olson
were "home" at the time of his arrest, the arrest would have been
illegal; but if he was not arrested in his "home" then the arrest
25 1
would appear legal.
Justice White, writing for seven members of the Court in
Olson, held that Payton required an arrest warrant to arrest an
overnight guest in the home of a third person. 25 2 Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun dissented without opinion.2 55
248. 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990).
249. Id. at 1686-87.
250. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

251. One's own body is not the fruit of a poisonous arrest. See United
States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) (illegal arrest does not prevent prosecution). However, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Olson found that the inculpatory statement made by the defendant after his Payton defective arrest was

poisonous fruit. Olson, 110 S. Ct. at 1687. Even assuming that Payton is violated,
this argument that a confession can be the fruit of a warrantless in-home arrest
can no longer be advanced if the confession is made outside the home. For a
discussion of this argument, see infra note 295 and accompanying text.
252. Olson, 110 S. Ct. at 1687.
253. Id. at 1686.
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Unaccountably, the Court approached the case as if it were one of
standing. The Burger Court had revised the all but automatic
standing rules of the Warren Court and had held that standing to
assert a fourth amendment violation would be determined by substantive fourth amendment principles. The test used by the Burger Court was whether the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy that had been invaded.2 54 Thus, the test
for whether an intrusion is a search, derived from the benchmark
case of Katz v. United States,2 55 is also the test for whether defendant has standing to assert a violation of the fourth amendment.
Because the Court in Olson treated the case as one of standing, the question for the Court was whether Olson had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the third party's home. Justice
White stressed that a person's "status as an overnight guest is
alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the
' 2 56
home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The Court noted that overnight guests are unlikely to be confined
to certain areas of the house, and are likely to have a measure of
control over the premises.2 5 7 The Court found that the privacy
interest of an overnight guest was at least as great as Katz had in a
public telephone booth, when he made calls that were protected
by the fourth amendment. 25 8 The Court specifically rejected the
state's argument that a place must be one's home in order to have
2 59
a legitimate expectation of privacy there.
2. Implications of Olson
Olson shows the peril of a mechanistic application of prece254. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) ("[Cjapacity to
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends.., upon whether the
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
363 (1967)). The Rakas Court rejected the Warren Court's view that standing
could be found simply by being legitimately at the premises searched. Id. In
typical Burger Court fashion, however, the Rakas Court found that the Warren
Court precedent did not really provide for standing for all those legitimately
present; rather, the facts of the Warren Court cases involved defendants who in
fact had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas invaded. Id.; see also
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
255. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
256. Olson, I10 S. Ct. at 1688.
257. Id. at 1689.
258. See id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (telephone booth is "a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as

reasonable").
259. Id.
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dent. It is of course true that one can have a legitimate expectation of privacy outside one's own home. But is that the true issue
in a case like Olson? The question in Payton was not whether the
defendant had an expectation of privacy, but whether he was arrested in his home. If so, an arrest warrant was required. Olson
also had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his car, or his office
if he had one, but that does not mean that the police needed a
warrant to arrest him there. 2 6 0 Payton was designed to protect a
person's home, not merely an expectation of privacy. The Court
in Olson confused the Payton rule with the threshold standing requirements of the fourth amendment. It never considered what
the true implications of Payton were, and as a result, the Court
never converged the Payton and Rakas lines of authority. Confusion reigns.
For example, let us consider the privacy interests of Olson's
friend, the homeowner. It would appear that the premises could
not be searched for Olson without a search warrant, following a
magistrate's determination of probable cause that Olson could be
found there. This is a result of the Burger Court's opinion in
Steagald v. United States, 261 which held that a search warrant is required to arrest a visitor in someone else's home. When Olson
and Steagald are put together, an anomaly results: Olson provides
a right to an arrest warrant reserved for homeowners under Payton, whereas Steagald gives the guest the right to a search warrant
because the police are arresting someone besides the homeowner.2 62 The homeowner is entitled to greater rights than the
arrestee, who must also be at "home" to trigger Payton rights.
This confusion occurs because the Court evaluated Olson as a
263
standing case and Steagald as a Payton case.
260. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1975) (warrant not re-

quired for arrest outside home).
261. 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (search warrant required for entry into premises
of person other than arrestee).
262. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 173, § 6.1, at 566.
263. Another example of the confusion resulting from Olson is the Tenth
Circuit opinion in United States v.Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 238 (1991). Jefferson argued that he had standing to object to
the search of the trunk of a car he was driving. Id. at 1248 n.l. The Court
rejected his contention on the ground that the owner of the car was present at
the time. Id. at 1249. Jefferson pointed out that the owner of the house was
present at the time Olson was arrested. Id. The Court responded, however, that
standing issues concerning homes would be treated differently from standing
issues in cars. Id. at 1251. Because standing is based upon a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court reasoned that a home scenario, where there was a
greater expectation of privacy, would be more likely to support standing even if
the homeowner was present. Id. The problem with this analysis is that while

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

41

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 1

1308

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36: p. 1267

It has been held that the right to a search warrant under Steagald is personal to the homeowner, and the guest-arrestee has no
standing to object to a violation of Steagald.264 But after Olson, if
the overnight guest has an expectation of privacy in the home, it
seems anomalous to find standing to object to the lack of an
arrest warrant but no standing to object to the lack of a search
warrant. 265
Of course, neither a search nor an arrest warrant is required
if there are exigent circumstances. The lower court in Olson
found that exigent circumstances did not exist. 266 That court reasoned that Olson was not dangerous, that police squads had surrounded the house, and that it was evident that Olson was not
going anywhere. The Supreme Court did not "disturb" the state
court's judgment. 267 The Court's decision does not add much, if
anything, to the case law on exigent circumstances. However, the
offhand resolution of this issue may indicate that the Court is getting away from micromanagement of state court decisions finding
illegal searches-at least where the state court uses the proper
268
fourth amendment standards.
H. Confession Made Outside the Home is Not the Fruit
of a Payton Violation
1. Discussion of New York v. Harris
The Court considered in New York v. Harris269 whether a Paythere is a greater expectation of privacy in homes, the degree of privacy reasonably expected depends on whether it is your home or not. The proper distinction between Olson, and Jefferson is that Olson really dealt not with standing at all
but with the substantive Payton right, which applies only to homeowners. Because that was not the rationale that the Court used in Olson theJefferson Court
was sent off to make meaningless distinctions concerning standing.
264. See United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1036
(1984).
265. The Nebraska Supreme Court considered a search warrant under Olson and concluded that an occasional overnight guest who was not present at the
time of the search, who kept no clothing or personal belongings in the house
searched and who had no key, had not established a privacy interest and, therefore, did not have standing to attack the sufficiency of the search warrant. See
Nebraska v. Cords, 237 Neb. 97, 465 N.W.2d 132 (1991). The Court did not
discuss whether the defendant was entitled to the protection of an arrest warrant. Id.
266. State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1989).
267. Olson, 110 S. Ct. at 1684.
268. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1065 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that strict scrutiny of state court decisions finding illegal
searches is inconsistent with efficient judicial management).
269. 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990).
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ton violation should result in the exclusion of a confession later

obtained outside the home. 2 70 In Brown v. Illinois,271 Dunaway v.
New York, 2 72 and Taylor v. Alabama,2 73 the Court excluded confes-

sions as the fruits of arrests unsupported by probable cause. In
each case, the Court rejected arguments of attenuation on the
facts of those cases. 274 In Harris, the Court went back to analyze
the underlying rights and policies involved, for a change, and accordingly reached a logically and analytically satisfying result.
In contrast to the prior cases of arrest without probable
cause, Harris confessed after an arrest made with probable cause,
but without a warrant.2 75 Because Harris was in his home, his
warrantless arrest violated Payton.276 The challenged confession
was made at the station an hour after the illegal entry into Harris's home. Harris argued that under the previous cases, the confession was not attenuated from the illegal arrest. 277 For
example, in Brown, the Court held statements made two hours after an arrest without probable cause were fruit of the poisonous
78
tree, despite the intervening fact of Miranda warnings.?
Justice White, writing for five members of the Court, held
that a confession made outside the home cannot be the fruit of a
279
Payton violation, and thus Harris's confession was not tainted.
The majority reasoned that unlike the prior cases, Harris was not
unlawfully in custody when he made the confession. 280 Justice
White argued that "the rule in Payton was designed to protect the
physical integrity of the home; it was not intended to grant criminal suspects . . . protection for statements made outside their

premises where the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect

. .

,,281

Thus, the violation of Payton constitutes an illegal search of
270. Id. at 1642. On remand, the Court of Appeals suppressed the confession under the New York State Constitution. See People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d
434, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 570 N.E.2d 1051 (1991).
271. 422 U.S. 590 (1982).
272. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
273. 457 U.S. 687 (1982).
274. Taylor, 457 U.S. at 690; Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 217; Brown, 422 U.S. at
602.
275. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1642.
276. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

277. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1643.
278. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604-05.
279. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1644-45.
280. Id. at 1644.

281. Id. at 1643.
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the home, but not an illegal arrest; and while evidence obtained
in the search of the home is subject to exclusion, there is no necessary connection between that search and a subsequent confes282
sion outside the home.
The Harris majority further noted that exclusion of the confession was not necessary to serve the deterrent function of the
exclusionary rule.2 8 3 Justice White argued that sufficient deter-

rence flows from the exclusion of any evidence found in the home
during the arrest. The incremental deterrence of excluding a
subsequent confession would be minimal because police in this
situation have probable cause to arrest outside the home, and "it

is doubtful therefore that the desire to secure a statement from'284a
criminal suspect would motivate the police to violate Payton."
The police do not need to violate Payton to arrest and interrogate
a suspect (thus there is no need for deterrence), whereas they may
need to violate Payton to obtain evidence in the home that they
could not otherwise obtain (thus there is need for deterrence).
This one-dimensional view-that sufficient deterrence flows as to
one type of evidence, so that another may be admitted-is typical
of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' interpretation of the deter28 5
rence basis of the exclusionary rule.

Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, contended that the rule adopted
by the majority would give the police an incentive to violate Payton.2 8 6 He reasoned that the officer would enter illegally to save

time, and perhaps exploit the in-home nature of the arrest to rattle the suspect and increase the likelihood of a confession. 287 Ex282. Cf.United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1990). In McCraw,
a warrantless arrest in a hotel room in violation of Payton was followed by incriminating statements and a consent to search, which defendant gave immediately
after the arrest while still in the hotel room. Id. at 226. Citing Harris, the court
suppressed the statements and the evidence, stating:
Assuming that the consent to search and hotel room statements were
voluntary by fifth amendment standards, the proximity in time and
place between the arrest and the search and statements and the absence
of intervening circumstances nevertheless require suppression of this
evidence to protect the physical integrity of the home and to vindicate
the purpose of the fourth amendment.
Id. at 230.
283. Harris, 110 S.Ct. at 1644.
284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (exclusionary rule
does not prevent impeachment because sufficient deterrence flows from exclusion of evidence from case-in-chief.
286. Harris, 110 S.Ct. at 1651 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 1650 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cluding evidence found in the house would be no deterrent,
because the officer would be no worse off as a result of suppression than if he had waited outside to make the arrest. Justice Marshall's argument is weakened, however, by the Warren Court's
own justification of the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule:
it is not designed to punish the officer, but rather to deprive the
government of the benefit of having violated the law. 28 8 Making
with the notion that
the officer and state worse off is inconsistent
28 9
the exclusionary rule is not punitive.
2. Implications of Harris
Harris is one of the few cases of the 1989-90 term in which
the Court bothers to analyze the basis of prior precedent. By doing so, the Court leads itself to a reasoned and well-explained result. By reinvestigating Payton, the Court finds that the true
concern of that decision is not the arrest itself, but rather the invasion of privacy that occurs when the officer enters without a
warrant to make an arrest. Although it is not apparent at first
glance, Payton involves an illegal search as opposed to an illegal
seizure. Presuming that the later confession is unrelated to the
search, the Court's view of Payton and its ramifications is eminently sound.
The Court's explanation of Payton may cause lower courts to
reach different decisions than they had reached previously in
cases where the police coerce suspects to come out of their homes
to be arrested. Before Harris, lower courts had found violations
of Payton on the ground that the homeowner was disrupted and
coerced while inside his home.2 90 But because there is no search
of the home in such circumstances, Payton no longer appears applicable after Harris. At any rate, even if these outside arrests violate Payton, no evidence obtained pursuant to such arrests will be
288. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 953 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The deterrence rationale for the [exclusionary] rule is not

designed to be, nor should it be thought of as, a form of 'punishment.' ").

289. See generally Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (exclusionary rule is
designed to return parties to status quo ante search; it was not designed to put
officers in worse position than if search had never occurred).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding
Payton applicable because "the important point is that in cases of... coercion to
leave the home . . . the privacy of the -home is effectively invaded"); United
States v. AI-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985) (Payton held applicable where

suspect was forced from premises by use of guns and bullhorn; court reasoned
that location of arrestee, not officer, is crtlcial under Payton), cert. denied, 976 U.S.
1144 (1986).
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excluded after Harris, because by definition the arrestee is now
outside the house.
Harris does not in any way question the fruits analysis in
Brown, Dunaway and Taylor. In those cases, the arrest was itself
illegal because it was made without probable cause. Harrismerely
makes the point that a Payton violation does not even result in an
illegal arrest.
It is important to remember that in Harristhe Payton violation
turned up no evidence. Where the Payton violation does produce
evidence and is followed by a stationhouse confession influenced
by the seizure of the tainted evidence, the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine is applicable. There is thus a distinction between a
confession which is the product of the Payton arrest and one which
is the product of the Payton search. For example, in United States v.
Beltran,291 police arrested Beltran in her home without a warrant.
During the arrest, the police saw cocaine in plain view. They took
the defendant to the stationhouse where she made incriminating
statements. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that "whether, or the extent to which Harris applies
may turn on questions of fact, such as when the police seized the
items in question or what motivated Ms. Beltran's statements"
and remanded the case to the district court for a factual determination. 292 Thus, if Beltran was rattled into a confession not by
the arrest but by the fact that the police saw the cocaine, Harris
would not apply.
I.

Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply to
Impeachment of Defendant's Witnesses
1. Discussion of James v. Illinois
James v. Illinois293 is a divergence from the Burger-Rehnquist

Courts' trend of expanding exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
To reverse this trend, however, the majority tried to extricate itself from the corner in which prior precedent had painted it.
While the Court may be said to have made the best of a bad situation, it cannot be said that the majority's opinion is a satisfying
and honest analysis of precedent.
James told police officers that he had changed his hair color
and style on the day after taking part in a shooting. 294 The trial
291. 917 F.2d 641, 645 (1st Cir. 1990).

292. Id.
293. 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990).
294. Id. at 650.
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court suppressed this statement because it was the fruit of an
arrest without probable cause. 295 Prosecution witnesses at trial
identified James, even though they admitted that his hair color at
trial was different from that of the perpetrator at the time of the
shooting. James called a family friend, who testified that just
before the shooting, James' hair color and style was the same as it
was at trial. The trial court, relying on the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule, allowed the prosecution to introduce James' suppressed statement to impeach the credibility of
296
the defense witness.
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Brennan for five members of the Court. The majority refused to extend the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule to allow
impeachment of defendant's witnesses with illegally obtained
97
evidence.2
Justice Brennan found a compelling distinction between impeachment of a defendant's own testimony and that of defense
witnesses. Despite his prior dissents on the impeachment exception, Justice Brennan argued that as applied to the defendant, the
impeachment exception served salutary purposes: it "penalizes
defendants for committing perjury," and yet "leaves defendants
free to testify truthfully on their own behalf." 298 According to the
Court, the impeachment exception keeps perjury out and allows
truthful testimony in, thus furthering in both ways the search for
truth.
In contrast, expanding the impeachment exception to encompass the testimony of all defense witnesses would result in the
loss of truthful testimony. Justice Brennan argued inJames that
the fear of impeachment of one's witnesses would likely chill
some defendants from presenting the testimony of others. 299 Unlike the defendants who could carefully tailor truthful testimony
to avoid reference to illegally obtained evidence, the defendant's
witnesses could not be so easily controlled.3 00 Justice Brennan
295. Such a ruling is still viable after Harris, which found that a confession
outside the home could not be the fruit of a Payton violation, but could still be
the fruit of an arrest without probable cause. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1644.
296. James, I10 S. Ct. at 650-51.
297. Id. at 656. TheJames majority refused to extend the rule because it
would not further the truthseeking value of the proceedings and would appreciably undermine the deterrent effect of the rule. Id.
298. Id. at 652.
299. Id. at 653.
300. "Defendants might reasonably fear that one or more of their witnesses, in a position to offer truthful and favorable testimony, would also make
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concluded that "an expanded impeachment exception likely
would chill some defendants from calling witnesses who would
otherwise offer probative evidence," creating a deleterious effect
30
on the search for truth.
Nor, according to the majority, was the impeachment exception necessary in these circumstances to deter defense witnesses
from offering perjurious testimony. 30 2 Unlike the defendant, defense witnesses are sufficiently deterred by the threat of a perjury
prosecution.
The cost-benefit analysis of the impeachment exception is
based heavily on the principle that sufficient deterrence of police
misconduct flows from excluding illegally obtained evidence from
the case-in-chief. 3 03 Justice Brennan concluded that such deterrent effect is much more limited if the evidence could be used to
3 04
impeach not only the defendant but the defendant's witnesses.
This is because the value of the illegally obtained evidence would
be significantly greater. It could be used not just to deter perjury,
but also to deter defendants from calling witnesses at all.3 0 5
Justice Kennedy, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, complained that
the majority had granted the defendant "broad immunity to introduce whatever false testimony it can produce from the mouth
of a friendly witness." 3 06 The dissent found no legitimate distinction, in terms of the policies of the exclusionary rule, between
impeachment of the defendant and impeachment of defense
witnesses.
Justice Kennedy was particularly concerned with the costs to
the truthseeking process if defense witnesses could testify to prosome statement in sufficient tension with the tainted evidence to allow the prosecutor to introduce that evidence for impeachment." Id.
301. Id. at 654.

302. Id. at 653.
303. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (exclusionary rule

does not prevent impeachment because sufficient deterrence flows from exclusion of evidence from case-in-chief).

304. James, 110 S. Ct. at 655.
305. Justice Brennan wrote:
[E]xpanding the impeachment exception to all defense witnesses would
significantly enhance the expected value to the prosecution of illegally
obtained evidence .... The prosecutor's access to impeachment evidence would not just deter perjury; it would also deter defendants from
calling witnesses in the first place, thereby keeping from the jury much
probative exculpatory evidence.

Id. at 654-55.
306. James, 110 S. Ct. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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bative evidence without fear of impeachment.3 0 7 He argued that
impeachment is even more vital for attacking untruthful testimony of a defense witness than it is for attacking the defendant:
the defendant's self-serving testimony will be given limited weight
by the jury anyway, whereas a witness who is apparently unbiased
will not be self-impeaching. Justice Kennedy also noted that the
state would suffer a negative impact from the lack of impeachment evidence because the jurors would draw a negative inference about the prosecution's case due to the absence of
impeachment that would otherwise be expected.3 0 8
Justice Kennedy advocated a rule that illegally obtained evidence could be used to impeach defense witnesses, but only
where there was a direct conflict between that evidence and the
witness' testimony.3 0 9 According to the dissent, the requirement
of a direct conflict would alleviate the majority's concern that the
defendant would be reluctant to call truthful witnesses, for fear
they would be impeached in virtually all cases. There is much to
be said for Justice Kennedy's argument that the majority's reference to testimony "in tension" with illegally obtained evidence
was an overstatement of the threat of impeachment.
2.

Implicationsfrom James

The flaw in the majority's reasoning is its assumption that the
defendant can tailor his testimony to avoid impeachment while
the defendant's witnesses cannot. After United States v. Havens,310
it is virtually impossible for the defendant to avoid impeachment
307. Id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy opined that "[a]
more cautious course is available, one that retains Fourth Amendment protections and yet safeguards the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial." Id. at
657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
308. Justice Kennedy reasoned:
The potential for harm to the truth-seeking process resulting from the
majority's new rule in fact will be greater than if the defendant himself
had testified. It is natural forjurors to be skeptical of self-serving testimony by the defendant. Testimony by a witness said to be independent
has the greater potential to deceive. And if a defense witness can present false testimony with impunity, the jurors may find the rest of the
prosecution's case suspect, for ineffective and artificial cross-examination will be viewed as a real weakness in the State's case. Jurors will
assume that if the prosecution had any proof the statement was false, it
would make the proof known.... The State must.., suffer the introduction of false testimony and appear to bolster the falsehood by its
own silence.
Id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
309. Mi at 660 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
310. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
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with illegally obtained evidence. Havens allowed contradiction on
cross-examination even though the direct testimony was carefully
tailored to avoid any reference to the tainted evidence. So the
Court in James intentionally underestimates the effect on defendants of the current impeachment rule, in order to provide a false
contrast to what would basically be the same effect if the evidence
could be used to impeach defense witnesses. This can hardly be
viewed as a head-on, direct critique of precedent. Indeed, the
majority opinion is disingenuous in the extreme. Unlike the other
exclusionary rule case from the term, New York v. Harris,31 ' the
Court's analysis of prior precedent in James is dishonest and unpersuasive; as a result,Jamesis an unreasoned exception to an unreasoned exception.
WhileJames concerns a fourth amendment violation, its principles are equally applicable to violations of Miranda. Mirandadefective confessions can be used to impeach the defendant, but
not defense witnesses.3 12 The Court has used fourth amendment
and Miranda cases interchangeably in determining the scope of
the impeachment exception. For example, Harrisv. New York 3 1 3 is
a Miranda case while Havens314 is a fourth amendment case.
J.

The Fourth Amendment Does Not Apply to the Search of an Alien's
Property in a Foreign Country

1. Discussion of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
One case, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,315 which did represent something of a doctrinal breakthrough concerned the fourth
amendment rights of non-resident aliens as to searches and
seizures conducted outside the United States. Verdugo-Urquidez
was a Mexican citizen and resident who was apprehended by Mexican police and transported to the United States for trial on drug
charges3 1 6 After defendant's arrest, United States law enforcement officials, working with Mexican officials, conducted warrantless searches of the defendant's residences in Mexico.3 1 7 The
311. 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990).
312. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
313. 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), can be used to impeach defendant's credibility).
314. Havens, 446 U.S. at 628 (illegally seized evidence admitted for purpose
of impeachin statements made by defendant on cross-examination did not violate his constitutional rights).
315. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
316. Id. at 1059.
317. Id. United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents conducted
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district court held that the searches violated the fourth amendment; the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
18
affirmed.3
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment does not apply
to a search of property owned by a non-resident alien and located
in a foreign country.3 19 The Court reasoned that the fourth
amendment's reference to "the people," as opposed to a particular person, was a term of art intended to refer only to a class of
persons "who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community." 3 20
The Court stated that because the defendant was not voluntarily within the United States and was not an American citizen,
he lacked sufficient connection with the United States to be one of
"the people" protected by the fourth amendment 3 21 Upon a
brief examination of the history of the Amendment, the Court
found that the purpose of the fourth amendment was to "protect
the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their
own [g]overnment," rather than limiting government actions
3 22
against aliens outside the United States.
Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished Verdugo-Urquidez from
Reid v. Covert.3 2 3 In Reid, the Court held that it was unconstitu-

tional for military authorities to try the wives of American servicemen living abroad.3 24 The Reid Court further stated that the
Constitution protects citizens whether or not they reside in the
the searches to gather evidence relating to the defendant's alleged drug trafficking activities as well as evidence linking him to the brutal torture-murder of DEA
Special Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar. Verdugo-Urquidez was eventually
convicted for that murder in an unrelated prosecution. Id.
318. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
319. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
320. Id at 1061. The Court examined the use of the phrase "the people"
elsewhere in the constitution-the preamble, second, ninth and tenth amendments. The ChiefJustice reasoned that "the people" appeared to refer to people of the United States. Id. The Court contrasted this phrase with the words

"person" and "accused," as used in the fifth and sixth amendments. Id.

321. Id. at 1066.
322. Id. at 1061.
323. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
324. Id. at 5. Both Mrs. Clarice Covert and Mrs. Dorothy Smith had killed
their husbands who were members of the United States Armed Forces on over-

seas bases. Id. at 3-4. Both were court-martialed on murder charges and found

guilty. Id. Because the women were civilians, the Court ruled that neither could
be tried by military authorities and released them from custody. Id. at 41.
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United States.3 25 The Court in Verdugo-Urquidz interpreted Reid
narrowly, limiting its protection to United States citizens residing
6
abroad. 32
The Court listed a series of cases relied on by the defendant
in which the Court provided constitutional protection to aliens
residing in the United States. 27 Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that in those cases constitutional protection was premised
upon a voluntary and significant connection of the alien with the
United States.328 By contrast, Verdugo-Urquidez's connection
with the United States (a few days of involuntary presence) was
not sufficient to establish a substantial connection and thus warrant his treatment as one of "the people."3 529 The Court found it
unnecessary to decide whether a long-term prison sentence-involuntary but substantial-would suffice to establish a substantial
connection with the United States.330
More broadly, the Court even left open the question of
whether illegal aliens residing in the United States were entitled
to fourth amendment protection as part of "the people." Chief
Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that the issue had already been decided by Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza.33 1

In Lopez-Mendoza,

the Court held that the

2
exclusionary rule was inapplicable to deportation proceedings."3
However, Lopez-Mendoza was decided pursuant to a limited grant
of certiorari, and the ChiefJustice recognized this fact in VerdugoUrquidez.33 3 Thus, the Lopez-Mendoza Court assumed resident ille-

325. lId at 6.
326. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1063.
327. Id. at 1064; see, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (denying children of illegal aliens public school education was violative of equal protection

clause).
328. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. at 1064.
329. Id. Compare Verdugo-Urquidez with Plyer, discussed at supra note 327.
330. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. at 1064. For a discussion of the lack of
clarity of the "substantial connection" standard established by the Court in
Verdugo-Urquidez, see Recent Developments, Foreigners, Foreign Property, and the
Fourth Amendment: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990),
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1037, 1040-41 (1990); see also Comment, United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Restricting the Borders of the Fourth Amendment, 14
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 267, 303 (1991) (pointing out inconsistency between Court's
implication that "an alien who had developed sufficient connection with the
United States would be protected by the fourth amendment regardless of the
location of the search" with Court's emphasis on location of search and difficulties attendant on carrying out fourth amendment's requirements during law enforcement activities abroad).
331. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
332. Id. at 1034.
333. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. at 1065.
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gal aliens were among "the people" entitled to fourth amendment protection, without explicitly deciding that issue because it
33 4
was not before the Court.
Finally, the ChiefJustice relied upon policy considerations to
limit the application of the fourth amendment. The Court asserted that if the fourth amendment applied to all foreign
searches and seizures, it would have a pernicious effect on foreign
policy and military operations of the United States.3 3 5 The Chief
Justice imagined a parade of horribles where the magistrate
would be determining whether the invasion of Panama was supported by probable cause.33 6 A possible response to this argument is that most, if not all, foreign policy needs could be
handled by excusing the warrants and probable cause under the
reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment. Foreign policy
needs would clearly constitute special needs beyond mere law enforcement,3 3 7 and such needs would undoubtedly be strong
enough to outweigh a personal interest in privacy or security so as
to justify warrantless intrusions.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. He argued that
the fourth amendment was applicable to the search, but because
the warrantless search of Verdugo-Urquidez's property was reasonable under the circumstances, the evidence obtained from the
search should be admissible.3 3 8 He reasoned that a warrant issued by a United States magistrate would have no effect in a foreign country.3 3 9 In essence, Justice Stevens' view is that the
reasonableness limitation applies to foreign searches conducted
by United States officials. The reasonableness standards utilized
must take into account that United States courts lack authority
over how the search is conducted.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See id. The ChiefJustice illustrated the consequences of allowing the
fourth amendment to apply to foreign searches and seizures.
Application of the fourth amendment to those circumstances could significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations involving our national interest. . . . mhe Court of
Appeals' global view of its applicability would plunge [the government]
into a sea of uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of
searches and seizures conducted abroad.
Id. at 1065-66.
337. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656 (1989) (justifying suspicionless, warrantless drug-testing under special

needs analysis).
338. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring).
339. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion. Although
he joined the majority opinion, he disagreed with the majority's
reliance on the term "the people" as a qualifying term, viewing it
instead as language intended to underscore the fourth amendment right.3 40 Justice Kennedy also found it anomalous and impractical to apply the fourth amendment warrant requirement to a
search of an alien's residence in a foreign country. As reasons
why a warrant requirement would be impracticable, Justice Kennedy noted the absence of local judges or magistrates, the differing conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that may exist in a
foreign country and the necessity to cooperate with foreign
officials.3 41
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. He
argued that it was unfair for the federal government to require
aliens outside the country to abide by United States laws when the
government need not obey its own laws in the course of investi342
gating the very extraterritorial activity that it has criminalized.
According to Justice Brennan, "the Fourth Amendment is an unavoidable correlative of the Government's power to enforce the
3 43
criminal law."
Justice Brennan further argued that the term "the people"
was not intended to qualify the class of people protected by the
fourth amendment 3 44 If the drafters of the fourth amendment
wished to qualify its protection, Justice Brennan contended, they
could have used more precise terms in the language of the
345
amendment, such as "citizens" or "residents."
Justice Brennan contended that the majority's position that
the fourth amendment protects only certain groups was inconsistent with the goal of the Bill of Rights which is to limit how the
government may act, rather than to determine against whom such
actions can be taken.3 46 According to Justice Brennan, the term
340. Id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "Given the history of"our Nation's concern over warrantless and unreasonable searches, explicit recognition
of 'the right of the people' to Fourth Amendment protection may be interpreted
to underscore the importance of the right, rather than to restrict the category of
persons who may assert it." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
341. Id. at 1068 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
342. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 1070 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 1073 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
345. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
346. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Bill of Rights, was not intended to
"create" new rights; it was designed by the Framers to prevent the government
from infringing pre-existing rights. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also U.S.
CoNsT. amend. IX.
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"the people" under the fourth amendment includes everyone to
whom United States governmental power extends.3 47 Justice
Brennan concluded that an alien defendant subjected to criminal
prosecution in the United States clearly is one of the governed.3 48
The government treats the alien as a member of the community
by prosecuting him.
Justice Blackmun also dissented. He agreed with the government's argument that the warrant clause is inapplicable to a foreign search since United States magistrates lack the power to
authorize a search.3 49 However, Justice Blackmun contended that
the probable cause requirement still applied to such a search, and
that the case should be remanded for a determination of probable
cause.35 0
2. Implications of Verdugo-Urquidez
The majority's broad holding in Verdugo-Urquidez, is notable
because it is relatively unencumbered by Warren Court precedent. In some areas, such as probable cause requirements and
exceptions to the warrant clause, the Burger-Rehnquist Court has
been unable to break free from the constructs established by the
Warren Court, and has resorted to shifts in emphasis rather than
changes in structure.35 1 In other areas, the Burger-Rehnquist
Court has been able to limit fourth amendment protection by taking advantage of certain Warren Court cases which left considerable room for further limitation of personal rights.352 The facts of
Verdugo-Urquidez provided a rare opportunity for the Rehnquist
Court to make its mark on virgin constitutional territory. How347. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1072 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan based this conclusion on notions of "mutuality" between nations. Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting).
349. Id. at 1078 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
350. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
351. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990) (Court rejected
Warren Court's strict adherence to two-pronged test of evaluating informant's
tips, but retained structure of that test). For a general discussion of the difference in treatment of constitutional criminal procedure between the Warren
Court and the Burger Court, see Saltzburg, supra note 1.
352. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court permitted
stops and frisks on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 20. This decision
unlocked the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment, giving the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts a virtual invitation to dispense with the probable cause
requirement in a wide variety of circumstances. For a discussion of the Court's
treatment of Terry, see supra note 21 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of Terry, see Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the
AMischief of Camaraand Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1988).
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ever one feels about the result, it is clear that the Court made the
most of its opportunity.
Justice Kennedy explicitly joined the majority opinion, even
though in a concurring opinion he rejected the linchpin of the
majority's analysis: "the people" who are entitled to fourth
amendment protection do not include non-resident aliens.353 Despite this apparent inconsistency, his concurrence made a majority of the Court and determined that the fourth amendment
would be completely inapplicable to a foreign search of a nonresident alien or his property.3 54 As a result, the "alternative
compromise" view embraced by Justice Stevens in his concurring
355
opinion has been rejected.
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court refused to be contained by its
previous reasonableness methodology; instead, it pushed more
aggressively toward a doctrinal innovation which renders the
fourth amendment completely inapplicable. Moreover, the
Court's break from standard reasonableness balancing was accomplished by reference to the text of the fourth amendment itself. The Court's reversion to text is rather innovative because
the Court had in the past, especially in the Warren years, eschewed a textual approach to the fourth amendment.3 56 Reversion to text of the fourth amendment could be an important
doctrinal development because the reasonableness clause would
be affirmatively held to predominate over the warrant clause so
that warrantless searches could no longer be presumed unreasonable. The warrant clause would come into play only when a warrant is sought to justify government action.3 57 It remains to be
353. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
354. Id. at 1059. Note that while Justice Kennedy appeared to disagree
with the majority's analysis in his concurring opinion, he specifically joined the
majority opinion and did not merely concur in the judgment. Id. at 1066 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Consequently one commentator's characterization of the
ChiefJustice's opinion as a "plurality" opinion is incorrect. See Comment, supra
note 330, at 303. Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia also joined in the majority opinion. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
355. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The "alternative compromise" would make the reasonableness standard
in the fourth amendment applicable to foreign searches and seizures. Id.
356. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (applying non-textual
approach to determine threshold question of fourth amendment application).
The Burger Court had once reverted to a textual approach to hold that a search
of open fields was not covered by the fourth amendment. See Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (open field is neither person, house, paper nor
effect).
357. See generally T. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 23-24 (suggesting that the
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seen, however, whether the majority opinion is a step in a new
doctrinal development or a one-time break from the past.
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court specifically refused to decide
whether an illegal alien who lived in the United States would be
one of "the people" protected by the fourth amendment.3 58 Presumably, however, the fourth amendment would apply, because
an illegal alien living in the United States would have the required
"connection" with this country to qualify as one of "the people."
Five Justices, in various opinions in Verdugo-Urquidez, indicated
that they would hold the fourth amendment applicable to
searches of illegal aliens conducted within the United States.3 59
However, two of those Justices have now left the Court.
The majority distinguished the fourth amendment from
other constitutional protections such as the fifth amendment and
the due process clause.3 60 These protections are not violated until evidence is introduced at trial. In contrast, a fourth amendment violation is complete at the time of the intrusion. Moreover,
the fourth amendment contains a qualifying term-"the people"- which is not found in these other amendments.
It follows that if the government officials in Verdugo-Urquidez
had coerced a confession on foreign soil, its admission would
have violated the due process and fifth amendment rights of
Verdugo-Urquidez at his trial in the United States. 36 ' It also follows that if the government officials conducted a foreign search or
seizure that "shocked the judicial conscience," the evidence obtained could be excluded from a United States trial under the due
Court has "stood the Amendment on its head" by reading the warrant clause as
the controlling clause of the fourth amendment).
358. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064-65.
359. Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 1067-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1070 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1078 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). See generally Note, Supreme Court Review: Fourth Amendment-Search
and Seizure of PropertyAbroad: Erosion of the Rights ofAliens, 81J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-

779, 794 (1991) (Court erred in applying "substantial connection" test
when such test not prescribed by fourth amendment and when incorrectly applyNOLOGY

ing test created).

360. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060.
361. See generally Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra
Firma of the United States, 20 VA.J. INT'L L. 741 (1980). Professor Saltzburg asserts that constitutional protection attaches "wherever U.S. officials are responsible for governmental conduct outside the territorial limits of the United
States." Id. at 741-42. Therefore, when U.S. officials are working in conjunction with foreign law enforcement officials to conduct a search of an alien in a
foreign country, they should request that the search be conducted in such a
manner so as to comply with the United States Constitution. Id. at 771.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

57

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 1

1324

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36: p. 1267

process clause. 362
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit relied on Verdugo-Urquidez to hold that the fourth amendment does not apply to searches and seizures of non-resident
aliens and their vessels on the.high seas.3 63 While Verdugo-Urquidez dealt with foreign soil, the court argued that its holding
should be equally applicable to water.3 64 The fact that a crew
member is American does not prevent the search, because the
crew member has no standing concerning most areas of the boat
which are searched such as the cargo hold of the ship.3 65
III.
A.

FIFTH AMENDMENT CASES

Production of a Child in Child-ProtectiveProceedings and the
Required Records Exception

1. Discussion of Baltimore City Department of Social Services v.
Bouknight
In Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 366 the
Baltimore City Department of Social Services obtained a court order removing Maurice Bouknight from his mother's control because of suspected child abuse.3 67 The Department obtained a
further order declaring Maurice to be a "child in need of assistance" thereby placing him under the jurisdiction of the Department.3 68 Under extensive conditions imposed by a protective
362. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (conviction reversed because methods used to obtain evidence violated due process); United States v.
Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978) (evidence obtained in foreign search may
be excluded if court's conscience is shocked); see also United States v. Van
Sichem, No. 89-813 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1990) (1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12597)
(evidence seized abroad by Dutch officials in search of apartment of Dutch national admissible under Verdugo.Urquidez; because defendant stated no factual basis for his claim that circumstances of search "shocked the conscience," there
was no violation of fifth amendment).
363. See United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 251 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 753 (1991).
364. li The analysis and language adopted by the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez did not favor creating an exception for searches on the high seas.
365. See United States v.Aikins, 912 F.2d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding
that "it [is] well settled that the crew has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the cargo hold of a vessel" (quoting United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486,
494 (9th Cir. 1987)).
366. 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
367. Id. at 903. Evidence established that Maurice had been physically
abused by his mother when he was as young as three months old and that this
severe physical abuse had resulted in several broken bones and fractures. Id.
368. Id.
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order, Maurice was then returned to his mother.3 6 9 Bouknight
did not comply with those conditions, and the Juvenile Court
granted the Department's petition again to remove Maurice from
his mother's control.3 7 0 Ms. Bouknight failed to produce Mau372
rice;3 7 1 Department officials feared that he might be dead.
373
The case was referred to the police homicide division.
The Juvenile Court directed that Bouknight be held in contempt
for failing to produce Maurice. In so doing, the Juvenile Court
rejected Bouknight's argument that the fifth amendment protected her from any incrimination that might result from her act
3 74
of pioducing her son.
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion for seven members of the Court.3 7 5 The Court's analysis was structured as alternative holdings, relying on two separate lines of doctrine: the
collective entity doctrine3 76 and the required records exception.3 7 7 As a result, the Bouknight Court found the fifth amendment inapplicable to the act of producing Maurice.
The majority in Bouknight assumed, without deciding, that
Bouknight's act of producing her son could be potentially incriminating because it would impliedly communicate her control over
Maurice at the moment of production.3 7 8 The fact that Maurice
may have been injured at the time of production could also have
369. Id. Bouknight was permitted to continue as custodian of the child if
she cooperated with the Baltimore Department of Social Services, underwent
parental training programs and refrained from punishing Maurice. I&.
370. Id. The petition requested that Maurice be placed in foster care after
he was removed from his mother's control. Id.
371. Id. at 904.
372. 1t The case was referred to the Baltimore police homicide division
after Baltimore City Department of Social Services filed a missing persons report
following findings by the Department that relatives and friends of Bouknight
had not recently seen Maurice alive. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 903.
376. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 100 (1988) (corporate
agent not protected from producing corporate records even though production
may incriminate him personally). The collective entity rule was established in
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). Under the rule, business entities may not
claim protection under the fifth amendment when required to produce records.
Id. at 74; see also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (officer of unincorporated labor union has no right under fifth amendment to refuse production of
records on ground that they could incriminate union or himself individually).
377. See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17 (1948) (fifth amendment inapplicable when government requires records to be kept pursuant to
valid regulatory interest).
378. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905.
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been incriminating, but was not in itself testimonial.3 79 The
Court had established an analogous rule for documents in Fisher
v. United States.380 Fisher provides that the contents of documents
which pre-date compulsion are not protected, because there is
nothing testimonial about them at the time of compulsion.38 m
However, the act of producing documents was deemed testimonial in Doe v. United States, 382 because by the act of production the
383
citizen was asserting existence, control and authentication.
Where any one of these three assertions is incriminating, the fifth
amendment protects against a compelled act of production. 84
In Bouknight, the act of producing Maurice was testimonial as
to existence ("Maurice exists"), control ("I produced him therefore I control him"), and authentication ("this is the person you
compelled me to produce"). Testimony as to Maurice's existence
was clearly not incriminating because there was no dispute as to
whether Maurice ever existed. 385 His existence was a foregone
conclusion. 386 Likewise, the government did not need the act of
production to show that the person produced would have been
Maurice. Therefore, authentication by the act of production is
not incriminating.
On the other hand, admitting control at the time of production would clearly have been an assertion that could have incriminated Bouknight, depending on Maurice's condition at that
point. 387 The Bouknight majority did not decide this issue, despite
the apparent applicability of the fifth amendment, as well as the
need to provide guidance to the lower courts on which aspects of
an act of production could be incriminating. Justice O'Connor
concluded that Bouknight could not invoke the privilege at any
379. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (compelling execution of
consent directive does not violate fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination because execution has no testimonial significance).
380. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
381. See id. at 409-10.
382. 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
383. See id. at 209.
384. Id.
385. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905.
386. Id.; see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). When
testimony attendant to the act of production is cumulative or obvious, it is a
"foregone conclusion." Consequently, there is no incrimination and the fifth
amendment does not apply. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
387. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905. See Note, Preventingan Abusive Parentfrom
Hiding Behind the Self-Incrimination Privilege, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
926 (1991) (communication of control at time of production might assist
prosecution).
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rate "because she has assumed custodial duties related to production and because production is required as part of a noncriminal
regulatory regime."' s8 Thus, the majority conflated two separate
lines of fifth amendment doctrine in order to resolve the case.
Regarding the collective entity rule, Justice O'Connor found
an analogy to the act of producing corporate records held permissible in Braswell v. United States. 389 In that case, the Court reasoned that because a corporate agent was compelled to turn over
records in his representative capacity, the testimonial act of production was a corporate act and not a personal act, therefore, it
was inconsistent to invoke a personal privilege to a corporate act
of production. 3 90 Due to this agency analysis, the Braswell Court
intimated that should the agent be subsequently prosecuted, the
testimonial aspects of the act of production of the documents
could not be used to incriminate him personally.8 9 ' The prosecution could state that the corporation turned over the records, but
not that the individual did. This result followed from the proposition that the act of production was a corporate and not a personal act.3 92 Braswell's nonconstitutional agency limitation is, in
3 93
many cases, tantamount to a grant of use immunity.
In Bouknight, Justice O'Connor argued that by "accepting
care of Maurice subject to the custodial order's conditions,"
Bouknight accepted the consequent obligations of production as
had the corporate agent in Braswell.3 9 4 However, because the act
of production would be in a custodial rather than a personal capacity, Justice O'Connor also relied upon the agency analysis of
Braswell to intimate that the state could not later offer the act of
production as a personal act of Bouknight:
We are not called upon to define the precise limitations that may exist upon the State's ability to use the
testimonial aspect of Bouknight's act of production in
subsequent criminal proceedings. 'But we note that im388. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905.
389. Id. at 907; see Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
390. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 1178-18.
391. Id. at 118.
392. Id. For a statement of the holding of Braswell, see supra note 371.
393. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 117. In some cases, the individual will be inexorably tied to the act of production even where the fact that he who produced them
cannot be introduced. For example, in small or closely held corporations, the
factfinder who hears that the corporation turned over documents can easily infer
that the individual defendant was the one who turned them over. Id.
394. Bouhnight, 110 S. Ct. at 907.
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position of such limitations is not foreclosed. The same
custodial role that limited the ability to resist the production order may give rise to corresponding limitations
95
upon the direct and indirect use of that testimony.
Up to this point in the opinion, the Court had been singularly
unhelpful. Indeed, the Court was like an adverse witness who
cannot be pinned down to give a straight answer. The Court implied that the testimonial act was incriminating, but then did not
decide the issue. The Court implied that Bouknight's act of production could not be used against her at a criminal trial but then
did not decide the issue. Instead of setting a guide for future decisions, the Court decided only the case before it and viewed the
case in a very limited way.
To make this opinion even more disconcerting and confusing, the above implications were placed in the context of an alternative holding. Justice O'Connor proceeded to analyze the case
under the required records exception. 39 6 On this point, she relied heavily on Shapiro v. United States8 97 and Californiav. Byers.398
As in those cases, the state's demand for information in Bouknight
was imposed as part of a "non-criminal, regulatory regime" and
was not "aimed at a selective group suspect of criminal activities."8 9 9 More specifically, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the
state's efforts to gain access to a child declared in need of assistance did not focus on criminal conduct and were motivated by the
proper regulatory purpose of concern for the child's safety and
40 0
welfare.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented and
took issue with both lines of the majority's analysis. 40 1 Justice
40 2
Marshall first rejected the analogy to the collective entity rule.
395. Id. at 908. Justice O'Connor directs the reader to Braswell v. United
States, 487 U.S. 99, 118 (1988).
396. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911) (public documents required by law to be kept are not privileged from compulsory production
because duty which custodian has voluntarily assumed overrides privacy interest
in documents).
397. 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (fifth amendment inapplicable when government requires records to be kept pursuant to valid regulatory interest).
398. 402 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (holding that state statute requiring person in accident to stop and give name and address was constitutionally permissible under required records exception, even where it compelled individual to
incriminate himself).
399. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 907 (citation omitted).

400. Id. at 908.
401. Id. at 909 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 910 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that
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He argued that Bouknight could not be analogized to a corporate
custodian because she was not acting on behalf of a fictional en403
tity, but was rather acting as a parent.
Justice Marshall also rejected the analogy to the required
records exception.4 04 He noted that as a matter of fact, the state's
scheme was "narrowly targeted at parents who through abuse or
neglect deny their children the minimal reasonable level of care
and attention," and argued that the state's goal of protecting children from abuse inevitably intersects with criminal provisions that
40 5
serve the same goal.

2. Implicationsfrom Bouknight
Bouknight is the classic case of a court using precedent mechanistically in an obsessive attempt to decide the case at bar at all
costs. What we know is that Bouknight must produce Maurice in
this proceeding. But we know little else. Most importantly, it is
unclear whether this act of production can be used against her in
a criminal trial. The Court's decision on the alternative ground of
required records creates uncertainty as to whether the Braswell
agency analysis would protect Bouknight in a criminal trial. Does
one alternative holding trump the other?
The result is also uncertain if the child's parent has never
been the subject of a prior court order. Arguably the result may
differ from that in Bouknight in that such a person would be more
like a parent than a custodian. That is true, however, only under
the collective entity reasoning in Bouknight where the Court emphasized that the court order established a custodial relationship. 40 6 Again, the question is whether the required records line
of authority trumps the collective entity analysis.
In discussing the nonconstitutional agency analysis, Justice
O'Connor refers to the "direct and indirect" limitations upon the
use of the act of production. 40 7 Apparently, this provides a
Bouknight was, first and foremost, Maurice's mother. She could not be merely
his "custodian" whose rights and duties were established only by state law. Id.
403. Id. at 911 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that

Bouknight's "role as Maurice's parent is very different from the role of a corpo-

rate custodian who is 'merely the instrumentality through whom the corporation

acts." Id.

404. Id. at 912-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
405. Id. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
406. Id. at 908.
407. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that "Itihe same custodial role that limited the ability to resist the production order may give rise to corresponding
limitations upon the direct and indirect use of that testimony." Id.
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broader grant of immunity than the Court provided in Braswell, in
which the Court referred only to limitations on the direct use of
the compelled testimony. 408 If the Court in Bouknight is prepared
to prohibit direct and indirect use as a matter of nonconstitutional agency analysis, it would seem coextensive with a grant of
use immunity. There would be little practical difference in finding the fifth amendment applicable or not.40 9 It should be noted
again that this issue is only relevant if the collective entity half of
Bouknight is predominant.
Under the required records exception analysis of Bouknight, it
does not matter that the compelled information could be used in
a criminal prosecution as long as a valid regulatory scheme is in
place. 410 Thus in Californiav. Byers, 4 1t the Court found that a use
restriction was not necessary to bring a statute within the required records exception. 41 2 Courts have made the required
records exception to the fifth amendment analogous to the administrative search exception to the fourth amendment: so long
as the government can articulate a legitimate need beyond mere
law enforcement, the traditional protections of the fourth and
4 13
fifth amendments do not apply.
By now it is apparent that the Bouknight Court's obsession to
find a way to have Maurice produced comes at the expense of
legitimate legal analysis. The two lines of authority used to decide the case are in fact in conflict with each other. The Court's
technocratic approach seems a peculiarly inept method of deciding important and sensitive issues concerning child abuse. Given
408. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 118 (1988). The Braswell
Court explained that, at trial, the government could not tell the jury that the
defendant produced the records. Instead, the jury could only infer this fact from
the testimony of others concerning the events surrounding the incident. IdL
409. A commentator has suggested that Bouknight may seriously impair the
states' ability to protect children and to prosecute child abusers. If states must
grant some sort of immunity in regard to the compelled production of the child,
abusive parents have "an incentive to hide their children once they have abused
them." Recent Development, ChildAbuse and the Fifth Amendment: Baltimore City
Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990), 13 HARV.J.L.

& PUB. POL'Y 1017, 1026 (1990).
410. Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561.
411. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
412. Id at 427.

413. For a discussion of the legitimacy of interests supporting an administrative search, see NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (allowing
search by school authorities without warrant or probable cause so long as search
is reasonable in light of school rules, method of enforcement and intrusiveness
of search).
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the majority opinion and what it does not do, one wonders why

the Court ever took and decided the case in the first place.
B.

Sobriety Tests, Testimonial Evidence, and the "Booking" Exception
to Miranda

1. Discussion of Pennsylvania v. Muniz
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 4 14 the Court considered the applicability of the fifth amendment and Miranda to sobriety testing. It
breaks no new ground, other than stating that there is a booking
exception to Miranda that lower courts have applied for years and
even that statement is rather murky.
After Muniz failed sobriety tests, police officers transported
him to a booking center. 41 5 There, they asked Muniz, without
first giving him Miranda warnings, his name, age, address, and the
date of his sixth birthday. 4 6 Muniz responded with slurred
speech, stumbled over his answers, and said that he did not know
the date of his sixth birthday. 4 17 Both the manner of speech and
the content of Muniz's answers were used as evidence that he was
418
under the influence of alcohol.
Writing for eight members of the Court, Justice Brennan
concluded that evidence of the slurred nature of Muniz's speech
was not testimonial 4 19 under Schmerber v. California.4 20 Since
Schmerber, the Court has construed the fifth amendment term
"witness" to apply only to testimonial evidence-evidence given
by a witness. 42 ' The Court has consistently distinguished between testimonial evidence and evidence introduced for its physical characteristics. Thus, a defendant can be forced to stand in a
line-up, give handwriting samples, wear certain types of clothing
for identification purposes, and give fingerprints and breath
422
samples.
414. 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990).

415. Id. at 2642.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (holding that compelled blood testing is not
protected by fifth amendment).
421. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2645.
422. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967) (standing in
line-up is not testimonial); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967) (hand-

writing exemplar is physical, not testimonial evidence so that its compulsion
does not violate fifth amendment); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53
(1910) (forcing defendant to don clothing for identification purposes is not pro-
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The slurred speech in Muniz was held to be physical evidence
because its relevance was divorced from the content of the words
themselves. 42 3 Because the Court has held in prior cases that
voice exemplars were non-testimonial, 424 the placement of
425
slurred speech in the same category is unremarkable.
The Muniz Court did not decide whether a person's performance on a sobriety test (e.g. walking a line or standing on one
foot) was testimonial, since Muniz did not challenge the lower
court's decision that such evidence was non-testimonial under
Schmerber. The Court noted, however, that many lower courts
have held that such tests measure physical capacity such as reflex,
dexterity and balance and, consequently, are not testimonial
under Schmerber.426 There is no meaningful distinction between
the physical incapacity shown through slurred speech and the
physical incapacity shown through unsteady walking. While
Muniz did not decide whether physical performance tests compel
testimonial evidence, it seems clear after Muniz that they do not.

With respect to the answer to the sixth birthday question, the
Court, with Justice Brennan writing on this point for five Justices,
held that Muniz's response was testimonial. 427 The state argued
that an answer to the sixth birthday question is not protected by
the fifth amendment because the only evidence derived would
concern "the physiological functioning of Muniz's brain," which
the state contended was physical and not testimonial. 428 Justice

Brennan responded that the physical nature of the fact to be
hibited by fifth amendment); People v. Brockum, 88 A.D.2d 697, 698, 451

N.Y.S.2d 326, 329 (1982) (breath sample is physical, not testimonial, evidence).
423. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2644.
424. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (evidence from
voice recordings is nontestimonial when "used solely to measure the physical
properties of the witnesses' voices").
425. The Court in Muniz stated that "[r]equiring a suspect to reveal the

physical manner in which he articulates words, like requiring him to reveal the
physical properties of the sound produced by his voice ... does not, without
more, compel him to provide a 'testimonial' response for purposes of the privilege." Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2645 (citation omitted). Only Justice Marshall dissented on this point. See id. at 2654 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).

426. Id. at 2651 n.16; see, e.g., State v. Badon, 401 So. 2d 1178, 1179 (La.
1981) (finding that Mirandawarnings need not be given before field sobriety test
because it does not involve fifth amendment privilege); People v. Hager, 69
N.Y.2d 141, 142, 505 N.E.2d 237, 238, 512 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795 (1987) ("Physical

performance tests do not reveal a person's subjective knowledge or thought
processes but, rather, exhibit a person's degree of physical coordination. . .

427. Muniz, 110 S.Ct. at 2649.
428. Id. at 2645-46 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 21).
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proven is not relevant; the issue for fifth amendment purposes is
whether the type of evidence used to prove the fact is physical or
4 29
testimonial.
Thus, facts about a person's physical condition may be obtained either through physical or testimonial evidence. When
they are obtained through testimonial evidence, the fifth amendment applies. If the police had compelled Schmerber to answer
questions about the alcohol in his blood, his responses would
have been testimonial even though the fact proven would have
concerned Schmerber's physical condition.
Justice Brennan concluded that Muniz's answer to the sixth
birthday question was protected by the "core meaning" of the
self-incrimination clause, which he found to be based in the reac43 0
tion to the horrors of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber.
According to the Court, the privilege protects a citizen from being placed in a "cruel trilemma." The cruel trilemma refers to
the following three unpalatable scenarios imposed by the Star
Chamber-first, the citizen was not allowed to remain silent, because if he did he would be punished for contempt; second, the
citizen could not testify truthfully, because it could incriminate
him and he would be punished on the substantive charge; finally,
the citizen could not testify falsely, because if he did he would be

punished for perjury. 431 In Muniz, Justice Brennan argued that
whenever a citizen was placed in "the modern day analog" of the
cruel trilemma, the evidence compelled must be considered
2
testimonial. 43

429. Id. at 2646; see Note, Fifth Amendment- Videotaping Drunk Drivers: Limitations on Miranda's Protections,81J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883 (1991) (whether
evidence is physical or testimonial depends on method used to gather evidence).
430. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2647.
431. Id. at 2648. See generally, Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988)
(discussing the basis for the privilege against self-incrimination). The Court in
Doe stated that:
Historically, the privilege was intended to prevent the use of legal compulsion to extract from the accused a sworn communication of facts
which would incriminate him. Such was the process of the ecclesiastical
courts and the Star Chamber-the inquisitorial method of putting the
accused upon his oath and compelling him to answer questions
designed to uncover uncharged offenses, without evidence from another source.
Id. at 212.
432. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2647-48. Justice Brennan argued that:
Because the privilege was designed primarily to prevent "a recurrence
of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber ... ." it is evident that a suspect is "compelled ... to be a witness against himself" at least whenever he must face the modem-day analog of the historic trilemma ....
Whenever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to communi-
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At first glance, Muniz's choice of responses to the sixth birthday question do not seem comparable to those of the citizen
before the Star Chamber. Muniz was not at trial and was merely
asked to respond to a question during custodial interrogation.
Therefore, Muniz could not be subject to contempt for refusal to
respond, nor could he be subject to a perjury prosecution for giving the wrong answer to the sixth birthday question to police.
Nonetheless, Justice Brennan found that Muniz faced the "modem day analog" of the Star Chamber and the cruel trilemma
when he was asked the sixth birthday question in the course of
custodial interrogation. 433 Justice Brennan asserted that when a
suspect is required to communicate "an express or implied assertion of fact or belief" then the suspect confronts the trilemma of
434
truth, falsity and silence which triggers the privilege.
The term "modem day analog" refers to Miranda v. Arizona,435 which transported fifth amendment protection from judicial use of the contempt power to custodial police interrogation
on the ground that the latter was compulsion. 436 The modem
analog as applied in Muniz is as follows. First, the silence prong
of the trilemma is triggered by the coercive aspects of custodial
interrogation, which is comparable to the coercive power of contempt, so in either case, the defendant is not able to remain silent.
Next, a truthful response (saying that he did not know the date of
his sixth birthday) could incriminate Muniz, which is comparable
to incrimination by truthful testimony at trial. Lastly, a false response (giving a wild guess as to the date of his sixth birthday),
while it would not result in perjury as it would at trial, would
nonetheless result in incriminating evidence which is comparable
enough to perjury to constitute a "modem day analog." Thus,
Muniz faced his own personal Star Chamber when trying to figure
437
out his sixth birthday in front of a police officer.
cate an express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the "trilemma" of truth, falsity or silence and hence the response
(whether based on truth or falsity) contains a testimonial component.
Id. (quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) (footnote
omitted).
433. Id. at 2649.
434. Id. at 2648.
435. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
436. Id. at 467.
437. On this point, Justice Brennan found that:
By hypothesis, the inherently coercive environment created by the custodial interrogation precluded the option of remaining silent. Muniz
was left with the choice of incriminating himself by admitting that he
did not then know the date of his sixth birthday, or answering untruth-
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Blackmun
and Stevens, dissented from the Court's holding that the content
of Muniz's answer to the sixth birthday question was testimonial. 438 The Chief Justice argued that the question was designed
to elicit the physical fact of Muniz's mental coordination. 43 9 The
dissenters reasoned that because the police were permitted in
Schmerber to extract Schmerber's blood "to determine how much
that part of his system had been affected by alcohol," 440 the police
could likewise "examine the functioning of Muniz's mental
processes for the same purpose. '441
The dissenters also took issue with the Court's analysis of the
"trilemma" facing Muniz. According to the Chief Justice, "the
potential for giving a bad guess does not subject the suspect to
the truth-falsity-silence predicament that renders a response testimonial .... "442 The Chief Justice reasoned, by analogy, that if
the condition of Muniz's eyes was relevant, a question concerning
what Muniz saw on an eye chart would not require a testimonial
response, even though Muniz might have to say "I don't know" or
make a wrong guess. 443 The dissenters could not see a distinction
between oral responses to an eye chart and oral responses con444
cerning defendant's mental faculties.
What about ChiefJustice Rehnquist's hypothetical case of the
eye test where the defendant's poor eyesight is relevant to a prosecution? When asked to read an eye chart during custodial interrogation, the suspect would appear to be subject to the modem
analog of the cruel trilemma-the same one in which Muniz
fully by reporting a date that he did not then believe to be accurate (an
incorrect guess would be incriminating as well as untruthful). The con-

tent of his truthful answer supported an inference that his mental faculties were impaired, because his assertion (he did not know the date of
his sixth birthday) was different from the assertion (he knew the date
was [correct date]) that the trier of fact might reasonably have expected
a lucid person to provide. Hence, the incriminating inference of impaired mental faculties stemmed, not just from the fact that Muniz
slurred his response, but also from a testimonial aspect of that

response.
Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2649 (citation omitted).
438. Id. at 2652-53 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
439. Id. at 2653 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
440. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
441. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
442. Id. at 2654 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
443. Id. at 2653 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
444. Id. at 2653-54 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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found himself. He cannot be silent due to the pressures of custodial interrogation. If he answers truthfully, and states that he cannot read the chart, such information can incriminate him where
poor eyesight is relevant. If he answers untruthfully and ventures
a guess about the chart, that information is incriminating as well.
So despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's use of a hypothetical which
he obviously feels does not present a testimonial problem, the
fact is that a testimonial problem does exist after Muniz. Much to
the dissenters' chagrin, the risk of making a wrong guess is now
the modern day analog of the Star Chamber.
Muniz does not, however, stand for the proposition that all
compelled oral statements are testimonial. If a compelled statement is not an express or implied assertion of fact which can be
true or false, the Court has held that the statement is not testimonial, even though it is a communicative statement. There is no
risk of perjury since such a statement cannot be false. 445 Thus, in
Doe v. United States,446 the Court held that a person's signature on
a bank consent form, directing the release of bank records assuming such records existed, was not testimonial since there was no
4 47
assertion of fact that the records did or did not exist.

In addition to the sixth birthday question, Muniz, when
brought to the booking center, was asked such questions as his
name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth and current
age. Muniz stumbled over the answers and gave incorrect information on some points. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of
four members of the Court, found that the content of the incorrect answers was testimonial on grounds similar to the sixth birthday question. 448 Justice Marshall agreed with the four member
449
plurality on this point.

The plurality held, however, that Muniz's answers to these
questions were admissible even though they were made in response to custodial interrogation, because they fell within a
" 'routine booking question' exception which exempts from Mi445. Id. at 2648.
446. 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
447. Id. at 219. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 826 F.2d 1166, 1170
(2d Cir. 1987) ("The directives here.., do not contain any assertions by appellants regarding the existence of, or control over, foreign bank accounts. They
authorize disclosure of records and information only if such accounts exist."),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988) with United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025,
1040 (2d Cir. 1985) (consent form may be testimonial if there is an implied assertion that bank records actually exist).
448. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650.
449. Id. at 2655 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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randa's coverage questions to secure the 'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.' "450 The plurality

noted that the booking exception would not apply if such ques' 451
tions were "designed to elicit incriminatory admissions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Blackmun
and Stevens, concurred in the result as to the admissibility of the
content of Muniz's responses. 4 5 2 The ChiefJustice did not find it
necessary to consider whether the questions to Muniz fell within a
booking exception to Miranda. He found Muniz's answers to

these questions to be non-testimonial and, as a result, not protected by the fifth amendment, since they were used at trial only
to show that Muniz's mental processes were not operating properly. 4 53 Chief Justice Rehnquist assumed, however, that a book45 4
ing exception to Miranda does exist.
Justice Marshall dissented from the plurality's adoption of a
booking exception. He argued that a booking exception would

lead to difficult, time-consuming litigation concerning its scope

4 55
and application, contrary to the Miranda bright-line approach.
After the booking questions, the defendant in Muniz was
asked to perform certain sobriety tests and to submit to a
breathalyzer test. 45 6 The officers explained to Muniz how the
tests would be conducted, as well as the consequences of refusal

450. Id. at 2650 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
12). Similarly, it has been held that Miranda does not apply to a routine postconviction presentence interview by a probation officer. This situation would
not amount to either a coercive environment or interrogation as contemplated
by Mirandaeven if the defendant is in custody and the severity of his punishment
might be affected by an admission. United States v. Rogers, 899 F.2d 917, 921
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 113 (1990); see also United States v. HerreraFigueroa, 918 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1990) (denial of reduction in offense level for
acceptance of responsibility because defendant refused to attend the
presentence interview without his attorney was not penalty for exercise of fifth
amendment right). In Herrera-Figueroa,the court did not decide whether, with
the Sentencing Guidelines, the presentence interview had become a "critical
stage" of the adversary proceeding at which the consultation with counsel is
guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Instead the court exercised its supervisory
power over the orderly administration ofjustice to hold that probation officer
must permit defendants to have their attorneys present at the presentence interview. Id at 1433.
451. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650 n. 14 (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 13).
452. Idoat 2652-53 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
453. Id. at 2653 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
454. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
455. Id. at 2655 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
456. Id. at 2642.
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to perform the tests. No Miranda warnings were given during
these explanations. 4 57 While attempting to comprehend the explanations, Muniz gave responses admitting that he was impaired
45 8
by alcohol.
Writing for eight members of the Court, Justice Brennan
concluded that Muniz's responses to the sobriety tests were admissible because the instructions from the officers "were not
likely to be perceived as calling for any verbal response" and thus
were not interrogation. 45 9 This result was obtained by a simple
application of the test for interrogation set forth in Rhode Island v.
Innis.46 0 The Court reasoned that the officers' instructions were
"limited and focused inquiries" which were "necessarily 'attend46
ant to' the legitimate police procedure." '
The Court found two exceptions to this principle on the
facts: where the officer ordered Muniz to count from one to nine
while walking the line and to count to thirty while standing on
one foot.4 62 This was custodial interrogation because it directly
called for a verbal response.4 6 3 Still, the Court could find Muniz's
responses admissible despite Miranda if they were nontestimonial
or non-incriminating. The Court found them to be non-incriminating.4 6 4 While walking the line, Muniz actually counted from
one to nine, so, except for the non-testimonial slurred speech, his
response was not incriminating. While standing on one foot,
Muniz did not count despite being directed to do so. He did not
argue, however, that his failure to count had any independent incriminatory significance. 465 Consequently, the Court did not
have to decide whether the counting was itself testimonial, but
the rationale in Muniz would seem to indicate that counting is tes457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 2651.
460. 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980) (interrogation includes express questioning
as well as conduct that officer should have known would be reasonably likely to
elicit incriminating response from average suspect).
461. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2652 (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.
553, 564 n.15 (1983)). Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's holding that
questions and instructions attendant to sobriety tests and breathalyzer tests were
not interrogation. Id. at 2656 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). He concluded that under the circumstances of Muniz's impaired state,
such questions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id.

(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
462. Id. at 2651 n.17.
463. Id. at 2651.
464. Id. at 2651 n.17.
465. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/1

72

Capra: Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: Fourth and Fifth Amendment

1991]

PRISONERS OF THEIR OWN JURISPRUDENCE

1339

timonial. Counting is an implied assertion that one number
comes after another, which can either be true or false. There
does not appear to be a distinction between the sixth birthday
question and the counting. The sixth birthday question in fact
calls for counting within the mind.
2. Implicationsfrom Muniz
The application of the booking exception in Muniz may be
important with respect to provision of pretrial services. In federal
proceedings, an officer may inquire about a suspect's financial status before a magistrate rules on pretrial release. This financial
information might be relevant to prove guilt. It might show that
the defendant had unexplained income for a tax violation, that
the defendant had money shortly after a crime occurred, or that
the defendant had no money and thus had a motive to commit a
crime. After Muniz, such questions appear to fall within the booking exception, even though incriminating information may be obtained. 466 While only four members of the Court specifically
adopted the booking questions exception, four other members of
the Court assumed that it existed. 46 7 Still, the Court failed to decide an issue on which the lower courts had been uniform for
8
years. 46
For better or worse, it is true that the booking questions exception detracts from the bright-line nature of the Miranda rule.
The Court in Muniz was inspecific about the parameters of the
booking exception, assuming the exception exists. The Court's
only statement was that the exception would not apply if the officer's question is "designed to elicit incriminatory admissions. '469 It is unclear whether the Court is establishing a
466. See, e.g., United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir.
1985) (questions concerning name and employment are within booking exception even though responses to such questions are incriminating).
467. Justices Brennan, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy adopted the booking
exception. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Blackmun, and Stevens assumed that the exception existed. Id. at 2653
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
468. See, e.g.,
People v. Vasquez, 141 A.D.2d 880, 881, 530 N.Y.S.2d 159,
160, appeal denied, 72 N.Y.S.2d 1050, 531 N.E.2d 670, 534 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1988)
(questions concerning identity are permissible without Miranda warnings, even
though answers may be incriminating); People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304, 309,
258 N.E.2d 699, 702, 310 N.Y.S.2d 287, 291 (1970) (questions concerning defendant's address are permissible without warnings, even though answer is
incriminating).
469. Muniz, 110 S.Ct. at 2650 n.14 (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 13).
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subjective bad faith test. Again, the Court could have accomplished more by not confusing relatively settled lower court
jurisprudence.
Lower courts have looked to objective factors such as
whether there could be a proper administrative purpose for the
question, whether the question is asked by an officer who routinely books suspects, and whether the officer would need to

know the information for booking purposes. 470 Despite the confusion left by the Supreme Court, lower court jurisprudence determining the scope of the booking questions exception is at least
arguably consistent with Muniz. 47 1 It is notable that the Muniz
Court did not attempt to place the sixth birthday question within
the booking exception. Such a question could have no proper
administrative purpose. Still, at least on the question of the booking exception, the Court in Muniz did not even rise to the level of
a lower court, rather, it confused settled applications of law to fact
for no good reason.
After Muniz, explanations concerning custodial procedures,
such as fingerprinting, transportation and inventorying, will not
be considered interrogation even though the defendant may
make incriminating statements during the explanation. This is
because such explanations cannot be considered to call for an incriminating response any more than did the explanations made in
Muniz. 472 Moreover, even direct questions about the suspect's
470. See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 147 A.D.2d 774, 775-76, 537 N.Y.S.2d 995,
997, appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 794, 544 N.E.2d 234, 545 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1989)
(questions concerning residence are within pedigree exception even though answers are incriminating; issue is not whether answer is incriminatory, "but
whether the police were trying to inculpate defendant or merely processing
him").
471. See, e.g., United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1989)
(pedigree information is always within booking exception, even if officer knows
such information; prudent practice to make sure that person arrested is correct
person); Gladden v. Roach, 864 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir.) ("straightforward
questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete the booking
process" are not covered by Miranda), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907 (1989); United
States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382, 389 (5th Cir. 1985) (questions by classification
officer concerning nature of defendant's crime were not booking questions
where classification officer already knew what defendant was charged with, and
testimony indicated that such questions were not ordinarily asked by classification officers), afd, 793 F.2d 1288 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1058
(1987); United States v. Hinkley, 672 F.2d 115, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (questions are not within booking exception where they have clear investigative purpose, and interrogation was conducted by officers who did not ordinarily book
suspects).
472. See Commonwealth v. Rishel, 399 Pa. Super. 413, 582 A.2d 662
(1990). In Rishel, after being arrested for drunk driving, the defendant was videotaped during processing at the stationhouse. Id. at 416, 582 A.2d at 663. The
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understanding of such explanations will not be interrogation
since they are considered "necessarily 'attendant to' " such explanations. 473 Statements going beyond the subject matter of the explanation could conceivably be considered interrogation after
Muniz since the Court emphasized that the officers therein strictly
directed the dialogue to the specific issues of a breathalyzer test
474
and a sobriety test.
Extended discussions with much incriminating information
can occur in these explanatory situations. A Minnesota court recently held that a fifteen minute t&e-a-tete in which 100 statements were made between a law enforcement officer and a
suspect fell within the explanatory exception of Muniz. It was not
carefully scripted, as was the exchange in Muniz, but the court
found all of the statements to be within proper limits of the sub475
ject matter of explaining a procedure.
C. Miranda Inapplicable to Questions by Undercover Agents
1. Discussion of Illinois v. Perkins
In Illinois v. Perkins,476 an undercover agent was placed in Perkins' cell. 477 Perkins was in prison on charges unrelated to those
being investigated by the undercover officer. 478 In the course of
conversation concerning a planned escape, the agent asked Perkins whether he had killed anybody. Perkins said he had and defirst part of the videotape showed Rishel answering biographical booking question and was admitted. Id. at 416, 582 A.2d at 663-64. The second part of the
tape, which was suppressed, showed Rishel being informed of his Miranda rights
and Rishel requesting counsel. Id. The third section, the section at issue,
showed the defendant being fingerprinted and photographed. Id. During this
process the defendant made voluntary comments and asked questions. Id. The
officer sometimes answered the questions, but asked no questions himself and
told the defendant that he could not talk to him unless he waived his right to an
attorney. Id, This portion of the tape was admissible under the fifth amendment
because the statements were, in part, an exhibition of physical characteristics
and not testimonial, and, in part, testimonial, but not made in response to an
interrogation intended to elicit incriminating statements. Id. at 419-20, 582
A.2d at 665.
473. See Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2652 (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553, 564 n.15 (1983)).
474. Id.
475. State v. Whitehead, 458 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (advisory interview that consisted of extensive discussion, where defendant and officer each made over 100 statements, does not constitute interrogation under
Muniz because discussion was within scope of questioning attendant to advisory
interview).
476. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
477. Id. at 2395.
478. Id.
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scribed the murder that the undercover officer was
4 79
investigating.
Justice Kennedy, writing for seven members of the Court,
stated that "Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from
boasting about their criminal activities in front of persons whom
they believe to be their cellmates.1 480 Consequently, the Court
held that interrogation by an undercover agent is not regulated
by Miranda even if the questions may elicit an incriminating response. 48 ' To reach this result, the majority went back and investigated the rationale supporting Miranda.
The majority reasoned that Miranda was concerned with the
'48 2
pressures upon a suspect in a "police-dominated atmosphere.
If the suspect does not even know that he is talking to a police
officer, the problems with which the Court was concerned in Miranda do not exist.48s Thus, a fair reading of Miranda shows that
the Court focused on the pressures upon the suspect, and that
compulsion is in the eye of the beholder. With undercover ques4
tioning, the beholder sees no police-created compulsion. 48
One of the virtues of Miranda, recognized as such by the Burger-Rehnquist Court, is its bright-line character. 48 5 Perkins ar479. Id. at 2396.
480. Id. at 2398. In Alexander v. Connecticut, 917 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2831 (1991), the questioning of the jailed suspect was
performed, with the encouragement of the police, by a friend of the suspect. Id.
at 748-49. Reversing its former suppression of the evidence in light of Perkins,
the court stated:
The Miranda "custodial interrogation" involves two elements. The suspect must be in police custody, and he must be aware that he is being
interrogated by government authorities or their representatives. Deception which takes advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in a friend
does not implicate the right against self-incrimination nor the fifth or
six [sic] amendment rights to counsel.
Id. at 751.
481. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399.
482. See id. at 2397.
483. Id. See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda:
What Is Interrogation? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEo. LJ. 1, 67 (1978) (undercover

questioning does not trigger Miranda because government does not rely on interrogation environment; "jail plant" situation does indirectly what Miranda forbids directly).
484. The Court discussed this point stating:
It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion results
from the interaction of custody and official interrogation ....

Ques-

tioning by captors, who appear to control the suspect's fate, may create
mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken
the suspect's will, but where a suspect does not know that he is conversing with a government agent, these pressures do not exist.
Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.
485. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986) (noting that
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gued that "a bright line rule for the application of Miranda is
desirable, 4 6 and that the creation of an undercover investigations exception to Miranda would destroy the clarity of the rule
itself. The majority properly rejected this argument on the
ground that the Perkins rule itself is a bright-line rule-if there is
an undercover investigation, then Miranda is completely
inapplicable. 487
The majority rejected the defendant's reliance on sixth
488
amendment undercover cases such as United States v. Henry,
where the Court held that incriminating statements deliberately
elicited by an undercover informant without the suspect's attorney present could not be introduced as evidence. 48 9 The Court in
Perkins noted that sixth amendment rights do not come into play
until charges have been filed on the subject of the interrogation,
and that, unlike Henry, Perkins had not yet been charged in the
490
murder to which he confessed.
The difference in results between Perkins and Henry lies in the
difference between the interests protected by the fifth and sixth
amendments. The fifth amendment protects against compulsion;
that is, undue pressure on the suspect. Compulsion can occur
during both the investigatory and accusatory stages. The sixth
amendment protects against intrusion into the attorney-client relationship. It essentially establishes an ethical standard, similar to
that in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, whereby
the state cannot approach an adversary client in the absence of
counsel. This standard only applies when an adversary relationship has been formed. 491 Thus, while the standard is triggered by
any state attempt to elicit information in the absence of counsel, it
"[o]ne of the principal advantages of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application" (quoting Berkener v. McCarty, 466 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)).
486. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399.
487. Justice Kennedy stated that the Court's holding permitting undercover
agents to dispense with issuing Miranda warnings to suspects in jail would not be
difficult for law enforcement officers to follow. Id.
488. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
489. Id. at 274.
490. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399; see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430
(1986) (by its terms, sixth amendment "becomes applicable only when the government's role shifts from investigation to accusation"); cf. Alexander v. Connecticut, 917 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1990) (right to counsel not circumvented
when defendant, in jail, charged with arson, confesses to friend acting as police
informant that he murdered third party who had information incriminating him
on arson charge, because no charge of murder had been filed at time of
confession).
491. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1981); see
also ABA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 4.2.
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is not dependent on the adversary knowing that he is being approached by the state. 492
2. Implicationsfrom Perkins
Unlike most of the cases from the 1989-90 term, Perkins represents a direct, honest and analytical appraisal of prior precedent. The Court returned to the policies of Miranda and found
that Miranda was concerned with problems completely different
from those presented in Perkins. Under the Court's usual mechanistic approach of applying fact to law, the analysis could have
been a disaster. What occurred in Perkins was custodial interrogation, at least literally interpreted, so the Court may have tinkered
with those terms in order to reach the same result. The consequence would have been a dishonest application of the custodial
interrogation test, which would undoubtedly have deleterious effects in cases other than those involving undercover investigation.
In contrast, a direct reconsideration of the underlying principles
of Miranda leaves its protections intact in the very cases where it
was intended to apply. 493

In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan argues that the
situation would have been different if the defendant had already
invoked his right to counsel, making Edwards v. Arizona 494 applicable. 495 The Court in Edwards held that a defendant who invokes
492. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment in Perkins. When a suspect

does not know he is talking to a police agent, Mirandawarnings are not required.

Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Brennan argued, however, that undercover activity constituted trickery which
could raise a "substantial claim that the confession was obtained in violation of
the Due Process Clause." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Marshall dissented arguing that undercover questioning of an incarcerated suspect constituted both custody and interrogation, and that the major-

ity's opinion was thus an unjustified "exception" to Miranda. Id. at 2402-03
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also expressed concern that police
would use the majority's decision to circumvent Miranda requirements by the
use of undercover agents. Id. at 2404 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
493. For a contrary view to the effect that Perkins is inconsistent with the
original goals of Miranda, see Glennon, Illinois v. Perkins: Approving the Use of
Police Trickery in Prison to Circumvent Miranda, 21 LoYoLA U. Cm. LJ. 811 (1990).
Glennon argues that Perkins impermissibly rejects the Miranda premise that custodial interrogation is presumptively coercive. Id. at 828. However, this overlooks the fundamental premise of Miranda, which is that a suspect needs
protection when subject to police interrogation while in custody. Miranda v.
United States, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (the "aim (of Miranda] is to assure that
the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process").
494. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
495. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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his right to counsel cannot thereafter be found to have voluntarily

waived that right if police initiate interrogation. 496 Despite Justice Brennan's contention in Perkins, it is clear that Edwards does

not apply to undercover investigations. Edwards is merely an outgrowth of Miranda; if Miranda is not applicable to undercover investigations, Edwards is a fortiori inapplicable. Edwards, like
Miranda, does not apply unless there is the kind of police pressure

that the majority in Miranda sought to prohibit.
The majority in Perkins noted that it did not have to decide
the question of whether interrogation by a prison official known
to be such by the prisoner would always require Miranda warnings. 4 9 7 In Mathis v. United States,4 98 the Court found a Miranda
violation when a prisoner was interviewed by an agent of the Internal Revenue Service about possible tax violations. 4 9 9 Other
less coercive situations may not call for Miranda warnings, even
though the prisoner is obviously in custody in the broad sense. 50 0
D. Admission of "Other Crimes" Evidence Does Not Violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause
1. Discussion of United States v. Dowling
In United States v. Dowling,5 0 the defendant was charged with
bank robbery. 50 2 On the issue of identification, the prosecution
offered evidence that Dowling had participated in another robbery wearing clothes and carrying a gun similar to those used in
the bank robbery.5 0 3 The government also sought to show that
Dowling committed the robbery with another person, whose affiliation with Dowling was relevant to the instant case. 50 4 Dowling
had been acquitted of that robbery, and argued that its introduc496. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.
497. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398.

498. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
499. Id. at 4.
500. Courts have held that questioning in prison was not coercive and thus

outside the scope of Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970,
973 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986); Cervantes v. Walker, 589
F.2d 424, 427-29 (9th Cir. 1978). The questioning that occurred in Cervantes
and Conley occurred in relatively uncoercive areas of the prison: the library and
the medical conference room. Moreover, in neither case was the questioning
designed for the express purpose of eliciting incriminating statements. Conley,
779 F.2d at 973-74; Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 427-29.

501.
502.
503.
504.

493 U.S. 342 (1990).
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
Id.
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tion at the later trial was prohibited by Ashe v. Swenson.5 °5
The Ashe Court held that the fifth amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 50 6 In Ashe, the defendant was acquitted of robbing six
men during a poker game.5 0 7 He was then charged with robbing
another man at the poker game. 50 8 The Court found that the subsequent prosecution was precluded, because all of the robbery
victims were robbed by the same group of people, and the defendant had been found not to have been one of the robbers of
six of the victims. 50 9 The situation in Ashe is different from that in
Dowling. In Ashe, the offenses arose from the same transaction; in
Dowling, on the other hand, the acquittal pertained to an unrelated act which was relevant to prove the prosecution's case as to
the crime charged.
The Court in Dowling refused to apply the collateral estoppel
doctrine to situations where facts underlying a prior acquittal are
used as evidence of an unrelated offense. 510 Justice White's opinion for six members of the Court distinguished Ashe on the
ground that Dowling's "prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case." 5 1 ' In contrast, the prosecutions
in Ashe arose from the same set of factual circumstances and the
question in each case-who was the robber on a certain nightwas dispositive and identical.5 12 Acquittal on one charge arising
from that transaction would necessarily require acquittal on the
other charge.
Nor did Dowling show that the jury in the prior case actually
determined that he was not the robber.5 18 In the later case, the
burden is on the defendant to make such a positive showing regarding the mind of the earlier jury.5 14 The Court found that
505. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
506. Id. at 445-46.
507. Id. at 439. The Court in Ashe defined collateral estoppel as "when an
issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment,
that issue cannot be relitigated by the same parties in any future lawsuit." Id at
443.
508. Id. at 439.
509. Id.
510. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 350.
511. Id. at 348.
512. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445.
513. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 346 n.2.
514. See United States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[Tlhe

burden is upon the defendant to show that the jury's verdict in the prior trial
necessarily decided the issues raised in the second prosecution." (citing United
States v. Friedland, 391 F.2d 378, 382 (2d Cir. 1968))).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/1

80

Capra: Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: Fourth and Fifth Amendment

1991]

PRISONERS OF THEIR OWN JURISPRUDENCE

1347

there were possible explanations other than misidentification for
51 5 If
Dowling's acquittal, such as that no robbery had taken place.
that were the case the event could still be used to link the defendant with another person who was present at the scene of both

alleged robberies.
The Court further noted that to introduce evidence of an unrelated crime, the prosecution was not required to show that the

516
defendant committed that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, similar act evidence is admissible if the jury could reasonably conclude that the act occurred and the defendant was the actor.51 7 Therefore, Dowling's
acquittal on the prior charge did not preclude the jury in the second case from considering his involvement.
Justice Brennan,joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dis-

sented.5 18 Justice Brennan argued that the majority took insufficient account of the burdens imposed upon a defendant when, in
effect, facts are relitigated in a subsequent criminal prosecution.519 As it happened, these very burdens which were ignored
in Dowling were found crucial in Grady v. Corbin5 20 discussed
below.
2. Implicationsfrom Dowling
For the purpose of determining whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies, the distinction the Court made between
facts which determine ultimate issues and facts which are merely
relevant to a prosecution is not a compelling one. Under the
principles of collateral estoppel, relitigation is prohibited if the
515. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 351-52. Justice Brennan, however, argued in dissent that "[t]here is every reason to believe that the jury rested its verdict on the
belief that petitioner was not present in the Henry home. Petitioner was
charged with such a wide array of offenses relating to the Henry incident that no
other conclusion is 'rationally conceivable.' For example, if the jury had acquitted petitioner of attempted robbery because he lacked the requisite intent, it
would still have found him guilty of a weapons offense." Id. at 358 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
516. Id. at 348.
517. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).
518. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 354.
519. Id. at 355-56. For a discussion of these burdens, see Recent Development, Double Jeopardy, Due Process, and Evidence from PriorAcquittals: Dowling v.
United States, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990), 13 HARV.J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 1027 (1990)
(arguing that sufficiency of jury instructions rather than protection of Constitution should be used by defense attorneys to limit evidence accessible tojury). Id.
at 1035-36.
520. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
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precise issue has already been fully litigated and determined. 5 2 '
This should be true no matter what the use to which the litigated
issue is put in the subsequent trial. If the jury fully and fairly determines an issue, it should not matter whether the issue is determinative or merely relevant in the subsequent case. It certainly
would not matter to the jury that heard the first case because they
would be unaware of any subsequent usage.
Ashe was decided at the very beginning of Chief Justice Burger's tenure and clearly contains a residuum of Warren Court jurisprudence. In Dowling, the Rehnquist Court reverts to the
unsatisfactory performance of the mid and late Burger years,
where the Court used unreasoned distinctions to limit Warren
Court precedent.5 22 The result of this case-by-case sniping is
similar to what occurred in the Burger Court era-a later decision
comes along that is apparently inconsistent, thus creating even
more confusion. 523 In this case, the inconsistent decision came in
the very same term (as will be discussed below).
E. Subsequent Prosecutions Impermissible If Based on Conductfor
Which Defendant Has Already Been Prosecuted
1. Discussion of Grady v. Corbin
Grady v. Corbin5 24 is a major expansion of protection under
the double jeopardy clause, as applied to successive prosecutions.
Corbin was a driver in a two-car accident that resulted in the
death of the driver and passenger in the other car.5 25 Due to mis-

communication in the District Attorney's office, Corbin was allowed to plead guilty to driving while intoxicated and failing to
keep to the right of the median, and received a minimum
sentence. 526
Corbin was later charged with reckless manslaughter, second
degree vehicular manslaughter, driving while intoxicated, thirddegree reckless assault and criminally negligent homicide. 527 In
521. For a discussion of collateral estoppel, see supra note 507.
522. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (limiting right of
indigent to appointed counsel by distinguishing between fine and imprisonment,
even though there is no such distinction on face of sixth amendment).
523. See, e.g., Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224-26, rehk'g denied, 447 U.S.
930 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (dealing with problem where uncounseled
conviction permissible under Scott is used to enhance a subsequent misdemeanor so as to allow for longer prison offense).
524. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
525. Id. at 2087-88.
526. Id. at 2088-89.
527. Id. at 2089.
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its bill of particulars, the state admitted that to prove these more
serious charges, it would contend that Corbin drove while intoxicated, failed to keep to the right of the median and drove too fast
in heavy rain.528
Justice Brennan, writing for five members of the Court, held
that the subsequent prosecution violated the double jeopardy
clause.52 9 The test given by the Court for subsequent prosecutions is whether the government, to establish an essential element
of an offense charged in that prosecution, "will prove conduct
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already
been prosecuted." 530
Justice Brennan recognized that the subsequent prosecution
in Grady survived the test of Blockburger v. United States,531 which
held that multiple punishments are permissible where each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not.53 2 In
Grady, the more serious crimes-manslaughter, assault and homicide-required an element that the lesser crimes did not. All
three of those crimes have statutory elements which differ from
drunk driving. However, the majority viewed Blockburger solely as
a rule designed to determine whether the legislature intended
533
multiple punishments.
Justice Brennan found a constitutional distinction between
multiple punishments and multiple prosecutions. 53 4 With multiple punishments, the double jeopardy concern is an enhanced
sentence, for the same offense.535 With multiple prosecutions,
528. Id.
529. Id. at 2095.

530. Id. at 2093 (footnote omitted).
531. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). In Grady, Justice Brennan found that while the
subsequent prosecution was not barred by the Blockburger test, the state must
show that, in addition, they would not be proving the same conduct. Grady, 110
S. Ct. at 2090, 2093.
532. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. In Grady, Justice Brennan calls the "same
evidence test" a misnomer because the test examines whether the same elements of the crime charged are proved and not whether the same evidence

would be used. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2093 n.12.
533. 110 S. Ct. at 2090-91 (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773,
778 (1985)); see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) ("[Ihe Double
Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended."); Brown v. Ohio, 432

U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (purpose of double jeopardy clause was to restrain courts
and prosecutors from imposing more than one punishment for same offense and
from using more than one trial to secure that punishment once legislature has
defined crime and set punishment).
534. Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2091 & n.8.
535. Id. at 2090-91.
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the dangers and concerns are greater than merely an enhanced
sentence and include: the burdens of duplicative litigation,5 3 6 the
possibility that the state will be allowed to rehearse presentation
of proof,53 7 the increased risk of erroneous conviction,5 3 8 and
continual anxiety and insecurity for the defendant.53 9 Justice
Brennan concluded that "a subsequent prosecution must do
more than merely survive the Blockburger test. ' 540 In order to protect against the greater harm of multiple prosecutions, the state
must show that it will not have to establish as an essential element
of the new crime any conduct which "constitutes an offense for
5 41
which the defendant has already been prosecuted."
Because the state admitted that it would prove the entire conduct for which Corbin was convicted in order to establish the essential elements of the more serious offenses, the subsequent
prosecution was barred. 5 42 Justice Brennan noted that a subsequent prosecution would not be barred if the state's bill of particulars revealed that the state would not rely on proving conduct
for which Corbin had already been convicted. 5 43 For example,
the subsequent prosecution would have been permissible if the
state had relied solely on Corbin's driving too fast in heavy rain to
establish recklessness or negligence, because that conduct was
544
not used to support the drunk driving plea.
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy.5 4 5 Justice Scalia engaged in
an historical analysis and concluded that the Blockburger test was
the exclusive definition of the term "same offence" in the double
jeopardy clause.5 4 6 Justice Scalia also decried the practical impact
536. Id. at 2092. Justice Brennan emphasized the burdens of duplicate litigation in his dissent in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 356-57 (1990)
(Brennan,J., dissenting). For a discussion of Dowling, see supra notes 501-23 and
accompanying text.
537. Id. at 2091-92. Justice Brennan opined that the opportunity to rehearse increases the risk of an erroneous conviction. Id. at 2092 (citing Tibbs v.
Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982)).
538. Id. at 2092.
539. Id. at 2091 (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
540. Id. at 2093.
541. Id.
542. Id. at 2094. The state admitted in its own pleadings that it would
prove that Corbin drove while intoxicated and failed to keep to the right of the
median, both essential elements of the homicide and assault charges. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id.

545. Id. at 2096-2105 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
546. Id. at 2096-2101 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of the majority's decision on the criminal justice system: "In
practice, it will require prosecutors to observe a rule we have explicitly rejected in principle: that all charges arising out of a single occurrence must be joined in a single indictment."' 547 Justice
Scalia concluded that because respondent was not being prosecuted for the same offense in the subsequent prosecution, the second prosecution should not be barred by the double jeopardy
clause.548
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate dissenting opinion. She
contended that the majority's decision was inconsistent with Dowling v. United States.5 49 In Dowling, the state was allowed to introduce evidence of a prior burglary of which defendant had been
acquitted, as proof of identity in a separate burglary. 5 50 Justice
O'Connor contended that the decision in Grady rendered Dowling
a "nullity in many circumstances."55 1 In Dowling, the Government was offering the testimony of a witness whose description of
the accused was similar to a description of a robber in a subsequent crime. 5 52 So the same conduct was proven as an essential

element in both prosecutions. 55 3 The same evidence ruled ad554
missible in Dowling is therefore barred by Grady.

2.

Implications of Grady

Justice O'Connor appears correct that Grady is inconsistent
with Dowling. In Grady, the prosecution was not allowed to reprove conduct for which the defendant had already been prosecuted; 555 under Dowling, the prosecution is so allowed. 556 The
only apparent distinction between the cases is that in Grady, the
defendant's conduct constituted a single "transaction," while in
547.
548.
549.
550.

Id. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
110 S. Ct. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Dowling v. United States,

493 U.S. 342 (1990)).

551. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Dowling, see supra
notes 501-23 and accompanying text.
552. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 345. The Government believed that the witnesses's description of the defendant "as wearing a mask and carrying a gun
similar to the mask worn and the gun carried by the robber" of a later, unrelated
burglary would strengthen the government's identification of the defendant. Id.
at 344-45. The defendant had been acquitted of the unrelated burglary charge.
Id. at 345.
553. Id. at 345.
554. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2095-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
555. Id. at 2094.
556. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348-49.
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Dowling the defendant was prosecuted for two unrelated acts. - 5 7

It is questionable whether that distinction is meaningful, because
Dowling is forced to defend twice as to the same conduct when it
is introduced in his second trial. Even though he is not being
prosecuted for that conduct, he is subject to duplicative litigation
and possible erroneous conviction. Indeed, the dissent in Dowling, written byJustice Brennan, emphasizes the same burdens of
successive prosecution that the majority unsurprisingly relies
upon in Grady.
Contrary to the implications of the dissent, the majority in
Grady does not establish a full-fledged "transactional approach"
to successive prosecutions. 558 If the Court had adopted a transactional approach, Corbin could not have been retried even if the
prosecution were to limit its proof to Corbin's driving too fast in
heavy rain to establish recklessness or negligence. 559 Even
though the proof would be different, the transaction would be the
same.
In practical effect, however, the dissent is correct, and a prosecutor is all but forced to charge all crimes in a single transaction
at one time, because it is rather unlikely that totally different
proof arising from the same transaction could make a subsequent
prosecution successful. In Grady, for instance, it is unlikely that
Corbin would be convicted on a serious charge for driving too
fast in heavy rain. The most damaging evidence is that of drunkenness, and that evidence cannot be used after Grady.
Another problem left by Grady lies in the second prosecution.
There will often have to be one trial preceding another to determine which conduct the Government intends to prove to support
the conviction, as well as which conduct was proven at the prior
prosecution. At this "pre"-trial, the defendant may suffer at least
to some degree from the same burdens of duplicative litigation,
uncertainty and harassment discussed by Justice Brennan.5 60
Moreover, the burden on the courts and on the prosecution is
557. In Grady, the single transaction is the one automobile accident. Grady,
110 S. Ct. at 2087-88. In Dowling, there were two unrelated crimes committed:
robbing a woman in her home and a bank robbery. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 344.
558. Grady, I10 S. Ct. at 2094 n.15. Justice Brennan advocated such an
approach in his dissent in Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 387-88 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), where he stated that the double jeopardy clause requires
that all charges against a defendant that are the result of one criminal transaction must be tried in one proceeding.
559. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2094 n.15.
560. This point was voiced by Justice Scalia in his dissent. See id. at 2097-98
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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obvious. Whatever the drawbacks of the Blockburger test, at least
its required comparison of statutory elements as opposed to conduct, can be done without an extensive pre-trial hearing.
Grady did not disturb the Blockburger test as the benchmark for
multiple offenses charged in a single prosecution. On the contrary, the Court affirmed the propriety of the Blockburger test for
that situation.5 61
Grady did not involve a conspiracy case, but the Court's conduct test leaves serious questions as to how to deal with subsequent prosecutions where a conspiracy is charged in either the
former or latter case. Three separate questions must be resolved.
First, can a conspiracy and the underlying substantive crime
be successively prosecuted? Although Justice Scalia said in his
dissent in Grady that this would not be possible given the similarity of conduct,5 62 his argument should be evaluated in context:
he was giving a parade of horribles in order to attack the reasoning of the majority. There is no indication in Grady that the Court
intended to overrule the long line of cases typified by Pinkerton v.
United States,5 63 to the effect that the collective criminal agreement

is sufficiently distinct from the substantive offense for double
jeopardy purposes. 564 While there may be overlapping evidence
in proving the agreement and the substantive offense, it is not
necessarily the case that there is overlapping conduct. In Grady,
the focus was on the same conduct, not the same evidence.5 65
Next, can an enterprise and the predicate acts be successively
prosecuted? In Garrett v. United States,566 the Court found that a
prosecution under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute
could be brought after predicate acts had been prosecuted.5 67
561. The First Circuit has held that Grady "pertains only to successive prosecutions, not to claims that multiple counts within a single indictment have
double jeopardy connotations." United States v. Ortiz-Alarcon, 917 F.2d 651,
654 (1st Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2035 (1991). In such cases the
Supreme Court "did not propose to disturb Blockburger's primacy." Id.; accord
United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 981 (2d Cir. 1990) (Court in
Grady "took evident care not to rule that this broader test was to be applied to
multiple punishments in a single prosecution").
562. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2102-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
563. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
564. Id. at 643-44 (double jeopardy not applicable because elements of
conspiracy distinct from substantive crime); see Callanan v. United States, 364
U.S. 587, 593 (1961) ("The distinctiveness between a substantive offense and a
conspiracy to commit is a postulate of our law.").
565. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2093; see United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 64
(3d Cir. 1990) ("The 'conduct' inquiry is distinct from an 'evidence inquiry.' ").
566. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
567. Id. at 795. Note that under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine, if the
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Grady cites Garrett without an intent to overrule it.568 Again, as in
conspiracy, the enterprise of the kind in Garrett is different conduct from that of the predicate acts. Lower courts have generally
held that Grady does not bar successive prosecutions vis--vis

predicate acts and the enterprise.56 9
Finally, when is a later conspiracy prosecution barred by a
previous one? Before Grady, lower courts looked at several factors, including overlapping time frame, congruence of co-con570
spirators, identity of overt acts and location of relevant acts.
These facts appear to be focusing on the identity of the conduct,
precisely the test that Grady espouses.
It would appear that the new rule delineated in Grady v.
Corbin is completely retroactive to all successive prosecutions
based on overlapping conduct. 57 ' Of course, new rules are not
predicate acts are prosecuted by the state as opposed to the federal government,
there can be no double jeopardy issue in any event. See United States v. Farmer,
924 F.2d 647, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1991). The double jeopardy clause does not
prevent successive prosecutions by two separate sovereigns. Id. at 649.
568. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2090-9 1.
569. See, e.g., United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1013-14 n.8 (2d Cir.
1990) (Grady does not preclude establishment of predicate act in RICO prosecution by evidence of previously prosecuted conduct); United States v. Pungitore,
910 F.2d 1084, 1111 (3d Cir. 1990) ("However significant Grady v. Corbin may
prove to be in cases of simple felonies, we are confident that it has nothing whatsoever to do with the compound-complex crimes at issue here."), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2010 (1991).
570. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 896 F.2d 68, 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 76, 133 (1990); United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154-56 (5th
Cir. 1978).
For example, citing Grady, the Second Circuit recently dismissed a second
conspiracy prosecution in United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 721 (2d
Cir. 1990). The first prosecution was for a massive international drug conspiracy. Id. at 718. Two of the defendants were granted judgments of acquittal because of insufficient evidence. Id. at 719. Of one defendant, the district judge
said that if the government had proceeded against him with a more narrowly
charged conspiracy, he would have sent it to thejury. Id. at 718-19. The government then prosecuted the two on charges of a small conspiracy to distribute
heroin in New York. Id. at 719. The Second Circuit dismissed the case under
Grady, rejecting the government's arguments that Grady applied only to double
prosecutions arising out of a single event, such as Grady's car accident and because the conduct that constitutes the offense in a conspiracy is the agreement,
and since a different, smaller agreement was at issue, Grady did not apply. Id. at
721. In applying the same conduct test to successive conspiracy prosecutions,
the court stated that in conspiracy cases, ajury infers from conduct of the defendants that the agreement has been established. Id. The proper focus, therefore,
is placed on conduct allowing a jury to infer that an agreement existed. Id.
571. Grady is "new" because reasonable minds could have differed about
the result; four presumptively reasonable minds dissented in Grady. See S.
SALTZBURG

& D.

CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE at

4-5 (West 1991

Supp.).
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generally applicable in habeas corpus cases. 5 72 However, there
are two exceptions to the Court's non-retroactivity rule. The first
exception is that the defendant should never have been tried at
all, that is, a prosecution is beyond the scope of lawmaking authority. 5 73 This exception would appear to apply to a new rule of
double jeopardy, since if successive prosecutions are barred, the
defendant should never have been tried the second time. 57 4 The
second exception would apply if a prosecution requires adherence to those procedures that are "implied in the concept of or5 75
dered liberty."
In a footnote in Grady, the majority recognized that an exception to the double jeopardy bar could apply where the state is
unable to proceed on a more serious charge because the additional facts necessary to prove such charge have not yet occurred
or could not reasonably have been discovered.5 76 An example is
a subsequent murder prosecution that could not have originally
been brought because the victim had not yet died. 5 77 No such
exception was applicable in Grady, where the prosecutor was in57 8
formed of the victims' deaths on the night of the accident.

IV.

THE

1990-91

TERM: IS THE LAW BEING REEVALUATED OR
MERELY CHANGED?

It can be argued in light of the 1990-91 term that the Court is
no longer a prisoner of its own jurisprudence. Certainly, Justice
Marshall, in his last written opinion, senses a possible wholesale
evaluation of Supreme Court precedent given the new appointments to the Court and the Court's implication in Payne v. Tennes572. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (habeas corpus cannot
be used as vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would apply retroactively to all defendants on collateral review
through one of two articulated exceptions).
573. Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).
574. See United States v.Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 550 (1982) ("[T]he Court
has recognized full retroactivity as a necessary adjunct to a ruling that the trial
court lacked authority to convict or punish a criminal defendant in the first
place."); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 511 (1973) (double jeopardy ruling
fully retroactive).
575. Grady, 110 S. Ct. 2084.
576. Id. at 2090 n.7.
577. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1912) (earlier convic-

tion of assault and battery does not bar prosecution for homicide when victim
died after first prosecution, because charges were distinct "both in law andfact").
578. Grady, I10 S. Ct. at 2090 n.7.
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see 579 that a 5 to 4 decision with vigorous dissent is subject to reexamination and likely reversal. But there is nothing in the
Court's fourth and fifth amendment cases from the recent term to
indicate that these re-examinations, if any, are likely to be true
critical evaluations of prior precedent. Rather, they are more
likely to be new votes on the issue. A review of the 1990-91 term
suggests that the Court is still largely uninterested in examining
the logic and critical persuasiveness of its precedent. If the Court
finds no visceral dissatisfaction with prior case law, precedent is
applied in mechanical fashion. If the Court finds dissatisfaction, it
580
rejects precedent in mechanical fashion.
A brief review of the five fourth amendment cases and two
fifth amendment cases will prove the point. The most "active"
opinion of the Term was California v. Acevedo, 58 t where the Court
overruled the Burger Court case of Arkansas v. Sanders.5 82 To understand the necessity of at least addressing the viability of Sanders, one must analyze two conflicting cases. The first, Carroll v.
United States,58 3 held that with probable cause an officer can conduct a warrantless search of an automobile.5 84 The Court reasoned that the mobility of the car excused the warrant
requirement-the car would be gone by the time a warrant could
be obtained. 58 5 The Carroll doctrine was later extended in cases
such as Chambers v. Maroney,58 6 and Michigan v. Thomas,58 7 to allow
579. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). Justice Marshall's dissent notes that certain
cases will now be subject to reversal given the Court's statement that a 5 to 4
decision with a vigorous dissent is now subject to re-examination. Id. at 2619
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
580. See Green, supra note 3, at 391-92 (Court in Acevedo expanded scope of
automobile exception because prior precedent was "administratively unworkable"); 399 (Court in Bostick relied on "long, unbroken line of decisions" tojustify use of ad hoc test instead of bright line standard).
581. 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1989-91 (1991) (separate treatment for containers
within automobiles no longer necessary under fourth amendment, overruling
Chadwick-Sanders rule).
582. 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979) (police must get search warrant before
searching personal luggage found within automobile), overruled, Acevedo, 111 S.
Ct. at 1991 ("We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern
automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders.").
583. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
584. Id. at 149. The CarrollCourt, perJustice Taft, defined probable cause
as "a belief, reasonably arising out of the circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction ...." Id
585. Id. at 153.
586. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (permitting officer having probable cause to
wait to search automobile until after it has been taken to police station).
587. 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (once car immobilized, probable cause to
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officers to conduct warrantless searches of cars even though the
cars were immobilized. The Court has explained that mobility
was not the only factor justifying the car exception; a warrantless
search was also justified by the diminished expectation of privacy
attendant to cars. 588
The case in conflict with Carrollis United States v. Chadwick,589
where the Court held that officers with probable cause could not
conduct a warrantless search of a footlocker absent exigent circumstances. 590 A footlocker is, in most circumstances, as mobile
as a car, but the Court pointed out that the distinction between
cars and other containers is not based upon mobility, but rather
upon a different degree of expectation of privacy. 59 ' The Court
found three distinctions bearing upon privacy expectations. First,
a container's contents are not in public view the way a car's contents are.592 A car is primarily a means of transportation, whereas
a container is a means by which things are kept private. 598 Finally, a container is not as heavily regulated as a car. 594
believe contraband in car continues and does not depend on reviewing court's
decision as to whether car could have been removed during time police were
getting warrant).
588. See generally California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1985) (diminished expectation of privacy also justified by "the configuration" and "the pervasive regulation of vehicles").
589. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
590. Id. at 11.
591. Id. at 12-13. Other factors diminishing the expectation of privacy in a
motor vehicle include vehicle registration, operator licensing, automobile inspection, and state and local codes regulating the use of motor vehicles. Id.
592. Id. at 13. Of course, much of the interior of a car is not in public view
either. Indeed, the increasing use of tinted windows further weakens any conclusion that a car's occupants and contents are in plain view. See Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion), quoted with approvalin Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12.
593. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. Note that a car is also a means of keeping
things private, and a container is often a means of transportation. One can imagine the mercantilistic disaster of marketing a car without a trunk, or an immobile suitcase.
594. Id. A house, which is the ultimate container, is more heavily regulated
than a car, and yet the expectation of privacy in a house is higher than the same
expectation in a car.
The distinctions between cars and containers set forth in Chadwick are obviously not compelling, but the Court was trying to make the best of a bad situation-it was trying to retain the car exception and yet not extend it to all mobile
containers. That this effort is doomed to failure is proven by the Court's resolution in Acevedo. Undoubtedly, part of the reason the Court came out as it did in
Chadwick was as a reaction to the extreme arguments of the government in that
case. The government contended that the warrant clause "protects only interests traditionally identified with the home." Id. at 6. ChiefJustice Burger, in his
majority opinion, spent considerable time and effort attacking that categorical
argument. See id. at 2-11.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

91

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 1

1358

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36: p. 1267

It would only be a matter of time before the container rules
collided with the car rules. 595 In Sanders, the Court invalidated a
warrantless search of a briefcase placed in a taxi. 596 The Court
held that the Carroll doctrine was inapplicable, because the probable cause to search was focused- solely on the briefcase and there
was no danger that the luggage would be destroyed before a warrant could be obtained; there was no probable cause to search any
part of the taxi independent of the briefcase. 597 In United States v.
Ross,5 9 8 the Court chose Carrollover Chadwick, holding that whenever there is probable cause to search a car independent of a
container, officers can conduct a warrantless search of any area
where probable cause exists, including containers in the car. 599
In other words, if there is car-wide probable cause, then the
container rules are trumped by the car rules. The Court in Ross
nonetheless preserved the Sanders rule, so that if probable cause
was limited to a container in the car, the police needed a warrant
6 00
to open the container.
In Acevedo, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, correctly noted that the combination of Sanders and Ross meant that
the "Court has drawn a curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search
of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." 6 '0
While the Court recognized the incongruity of this conflicting
precedent, its solution was hardly well-considered. The Court
simply overruled Sanders, without exploring whether the alternative of overruling Ross and Carrollwould be more consistent with
fourth amendment principles. 60 2 The Court's mechanistic choice
fails to persuade us that the Carroll-Chambersdoctrine makes any
595. Chadwick was not really such a case, because the government did not
contend that the brief contact between the footlocker and defendant's automobile made the footlocker search an automobile search. Id. at 11. The government took the more extreme position that the warrant clause "protects only
dwellings and other specifically designated locales." Id. at 7.
For a discussion of what a court should do when two lines of irreconcilable
precedent apply equally to a fact situation, see Hynes v. New York Cent. R. Co.,
231 N.Y. 229, 235-36, 131 N.E. 898, 900 (1921) (Cardozo,J.) (court should apply precedent that is more consistent with societal expectation, logic and public
good).
596. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979).
597. Id. at 762-63.
598. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
599. Id. at 821.
600. Id. at 824.
601. California v. Acevedo, Ill S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991).
602. See id.
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sense as a matter of logic or societal expectation. The Court does
nothing to resolve the inherent conflict between a rule allowing
warrantless searches of cars and one requiring a warrant for containers, whether in a car or not. So long as Chadwick is still on the
books, this conflict continues. The Court did not revisit or even
discuss the reasons why there is a diminished expectation of privacy in cars as compared to containers. As a result, the Court
6 03
resolved the case before it and established a bright-line rule,
but did nothing to justify its opinion as a legitimate rule of law.
Not surprisingly, the Court has left yet another anomaly-a briefcase receives the protection of the warrant requirement until the
precise moment that it is placed in a car. At that point, there is a
metaphysical change in privacy expectation; it diminishes. Not
surprisingly, the Court's reasons for overruling Sanders are unpersuasive. This is to be expected whenever the Court proceeds
from result-oriented presumptions, such as presuming that the
Carroll doctrine is a proper, controlling rule of law.
One of the Court's reasons for overruling Sanders was that a
container found in a search where there is car-wide probable
cause is as easy for the police to store, or for the suspect to destroy, as one found in a search where the probable cause is specific to the container. 604 There is no practical distinction between
a container covered by Ross and a container covered by Sanders.
While this is true, it only indicates why the containers should be
treated the same, not which rule should apply to them.
Additionally, the Acevedo Court overruled Sanders because, as
a result of Sanders, officers may be tempted to establish the general probable cause required by Ross.60 5 This explanation proceeds from the remarkable premise that an officer may search in
order to establish probable cause. Even under Ross, an officer without probable cause to search a vehicle is not permitted to estab6 06
lish that probable cause by searching that vehicle.
Finally, the Court in Acevedo rejected Sanders because Sanders
provides minimal privacy protection-a warrant to search a
container would be routinely issued anyway, or else the police
603. Id. at 1988 ("We now agree that a container found after a general
search of the automobile and a container found in a car after a limited search for
the container are equally easy for the police to store and for the suspect to hide
or destroy.").
604. Id.
605. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
606. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1997 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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would be able to search the container incident to arrest. 60 7 But
the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to containers in the trunk, which is the very fact situation ofAcevedo.6 0 8 And
the argument that a warrant should be excused because the police
would usually have probable cause anyway shows an egregious
misunderstanding of the warrant requirement. Warrants are required even if the police have probable cause, so that the police,
who are in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, are
prevented from making self-interested determinations that prob60 9
able cause exists.
In sum, the Court in Acevedo has shown that it is not fearful of
overruling prior precedent. However, when it does overrule precedent it is reluctant to freshly investigate the entirety of applicable precedent to determine which doctrines are legitimate and
which are not. Only Justice Scalia, writing an opinion concurring
in the judgment, took a broader view in Acevedo. He correctly recognized that the Court's jurisprudence concerning the warrant
requirement "lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness
alone. ' 6 10 His solution was to return to the "first principle" that
the protection of the fourth amendment is generally contiguous
with that provided by the common law. 611 Whatever one thinks
of this solution, it is at least a fresh look at the body of fourth
amendment law which requires us to re-evaluate our assumptions.
In California v. Hodari D.,6 12 the 1990-91 Court held that a
non-physical show of force becomes a seizure only when the citizen submits to it.613 Thus, a suspect who flees from an officer's
607. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1989; see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981) (fourth amendment permits search incident to arrest of closed containers
in passenger compartment of automobile).
608. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 n.4 (1981).
609. SeeJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("[Fourth amendment's] protection consists in requiring that ...inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.").
610. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. at 1992 (Scalia, J., concurring).
611. Id. at 1993 (Scalia, J., concurring).
612. 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991).
613. Id. at 1550. The case arose when officers encountered a group of
youths who were huddled around a car and who fled when they saw the officers.
Hodari, one of the group who ran, threw away a small rock as a pursuing officer
was about to catch him. The officer tackled Hodari, handcuffed him and radioed
for assistance. Subsequently, the officer discovered that the discarded rock was
crack cocaine. Hodari claimed that the pursuit was a seizure, and because there
was no legal cause for the pursuit, it violated the fourth amendment. The Court
held that Hodari had not been seized at the time he threw the rock away, and
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show of authority is not seized until he is actually stopped by
physical force or submits to a show of authority. 61 4 Until then,
anything found by the police is legally obtained because no
seizure has occurred to trigger the fourth amendment. In previous cases, such as United States v. Mendenhall,615 the Court had
stated that the test for a fourth amendment seizure was whether a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave an officer's presence. 616 A strict application of this precedent would have meant
that Hodari was seized by the officer's show of authority in pursuing him; at any rate, the Court assumed that the officer's pursuit
of Hodari was a show of authority. 617 Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, felt unbound by the Mendenhall test, reasoning that it
states a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for determining
a seizure. 618 Justice Scalia referred to the common law pertaining
to seizures and found it determinative of the fourth amendment
6 19
question.
Like Horton v. California620 in the previous term, the decision
in Hodari provides a notable exception to the Court's slavish adherence to unexamined doctrine. There is no reason to apply the
Mendenhall reasonable person test to a person who does not in
fact yield to a show of authority. Such a person would receive a
fourth amendment windfall. While a slavish adherence to the
common law may be equally problematic, at least the Court in
Hodari was willing to reinvestigate all the implications of its prior
precedent concerning seizure. 62 1
therefore the fourth amendment did not apply to anything that occurred until
Hodari was tackled. Id

614. Id. at 1551. A simple example of authority would be: "Stop you are
under arrest." Under Hodari D., there is no fourth amendment seizure until
either the authority uses physical force or until the suspect submits to the authority. ld

615. 446 U.S. 544 (1986).
616. Id. at 554 (person seized under fourth amendment when reasonable
person would have concluded that he was not free to leave); see, e.g., Immigration

&Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting Mendenhall,
446 U.S. at 554).
617. Hodari D., I lIS. Ct. at 1552.
618. Id. at 1551.
619. Id. at 1549-50.
620. 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2304 (1990) (evidence seized in plain view does not
violate fourth amendment even if not found inadvertently).
621. HodariD., 11 S. Ct. at 1549-51. Adherence to the historical common
law approach has the virtue of limiting, to some degree, the judge's subjective

preferences. However, an application of common law principles to modem situations can be ambiguous, and hence subject to result-orientation. For a debate
on this point, see the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), both of which purport to apply the common law ap-
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In another 1990-91 fourth amendment case, the Court in
Florida v. Bostick 6 22 rejected the lower court's alleged per se rule

that suspicionless questioning of passengers inside a bus violates
the fourth amendment.6 28 By approaching the issue as one involving a per se rule, the Court essentially decided nothing. Certainly, one can envision some questioning on a bus under some
circumstances which would constitute a mere encounter. The
Court avoided all the hard questions, much as it did in the previ6 24
ous term in the Bouknight case.
In Florida v. Jimeno,625 the Court held that an officer could
reasonably conclude that when a suspect gave general consent to
a search of his car, he also consented to a search of a paper bag
lying on the floor of his car.626 Jimeno is a simple application of
the objective reasonableness standards applicable to consent
searches. 627 Jimeno breaks no new ground and makes no attempt
to review old ground.
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,628 the Court held that a
jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable
cause within forty-eight hours of arrest will usually comply with
the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment. 629
Previously, the Court in Gerstein v. Pugh630 had held that the
fourth amendment requires a prompt determination of probable
cause after a warrantless arrest. 63 ' Justice O'Connor, writing for
proach to the issue of whether the fourth amendment requires a warrant for a
public arrest. The same problem of ambiguity in applying historical common
law principles to modem situations can be found in the Court's jurisprudence
concerning the civil right to jury trial. See Capra, Discretion Must Be Controlled,
Judicial Authority Circumscribed, Federalism Preserved, Plain Meaning Enforced, and
Everything Must Be Simplified: Recent Supreme Court Contributionsto FederalCivil Practice, 50 MD. L. REv. 632, 711-15 (1991).
622. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
623. Id. at 2389.
624. For a discussion of Bouknight, see supra notes 366-410 and accompanying text. It is notable that both Bouknight and Bostick were written by Justice
O'Connor. See also Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743, 1748 (1991) (O'Connor,
J.) (excluding evidence for defendant's failure to comply with notice and hearing
requirement not per se violation of constitutional right to effective defense).
625. 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991).
626. Id. at 1804.
627. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990) (fourth
amendment only requires that officer act reasonably in judging whether there
was valid consent). For a discussion of Rodriguez, see supra notes 149-84 and
accompanying text.
628. 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
629. Id. at 1670.
630. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
631. Id. at 125.
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the majority in McLaughlin, framed the question as what did the
Court in Gerstein mean by "prompt." 632 The majority applied Gerstein as if it were written in stone. It gave no consideration to
common law principles or the historical underpinnings of the
fourth amendment. It showed little concern for the individual interests at stake when a presumptively innocent person is arrested.
McLaughlin is indicative of the rigid, blind application of precedent that was found in cases from the 1989-90 term such as Ala63 4
bama v. White 633 and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz.

The Court addressed the fifth amendment in Minnick v. Mis-

63 6
sissippi 635 and held that the protections of Edwards v. Arizona

continue even after the suspect consults an attorney.63 7 The
Court in Edwards had adopted a per se rule that once the suspect
invokes his right to counsel, police-initiated interrogation in the
absence of counsel is impermissible. 63 8 Edwards had never con-

sulted his counsel before confessing.63 9 Minnick had done so extensively, but counsel was not present during his confession. 640
The Court held that the policies behind Edwards-preventing harassment of suspects and providing bright-line regulation-were
equally applicable where suspects had consulted with counsel. 64 1
Minnick is a simple application of fact to law, but at least the Court
analyzed the underpinnings of Edwards.
Finally, the Court in McNeil v. Wisconsin,642 held that the invocation of the sixth amendment right to counsel at an initial appearance before a magistrate was offense-specific 643 and did not
constitute an invocation of the suspect's fifth amendment right to
632. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. at 1669.
633. 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990). For a discussion of White, see supra notes 64111 and accompanying text.
634. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). For a discussion of Sitz, see supra notes 9-43
and accompanying text.
635. 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990).
636. 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (waiver of right to counsel, once invoked,
not only must be voluntary, but also must be knowing and intelligent).
637. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 491.
638. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. Once an accused invokes his right to

counsel, the police may not interrogate him without benefit of counsel "unless
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Id. at 485.

639. Id. at 479.
640. Minnick, 11 S. Ct. at 488-89.
641. Id. at 491.
642. 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991).
643. Id. at 2207. The right is "offense-specific" in that it cannot be invoked
once for all future prosecutions. Id.
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counsel under Miranda.644 This distinction is determinative because if the suspect invokes his Miranda right to counsel, policeinitiated interrogation in the absence of counsel is impermissible
even if the interrogation concerns a charge other than that for
which the defendant has been arrested.64 5 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, reasoned that it would do more harm than good
if an invocation of the right to counsel at an initial appearance was
presumed to constitute an invocation of Miranda rights as well; it
would mean that persons in pre-trial custody would be unapproachable by police as to other crimes, "even though they have
never expressed any unwillingness to be questioned." 646
McNeil is admittedly utilitarian, and shows the Court's continued reluctance to expand Miranda rights. Still, the Court has retained the prophylactic house of cards that the Warren and
Burger Courts erected to regulate police confessions. The patchwork quilt of the law of confessions is evident when McNeil is
placed in juxtaposition with Minnich-the Court gives a strict construction to Miranda and what constitutes an invocation of Miranda rights in McNeil, but gives a broad construction to the
protections afforded the suspect who actually invokes the Miranda
right to counsel in Minnick. The Court has never explained why it
is establishing significant and admittedly overbroad protection in
one area, and none in another.
The interesting question left from McNeil is whether a suspect at an initial proceeding can specifically invoke the Miranda
right to counsel, thereby precluding police-initiated interrogation
in the absence of counsel as to any crime. Justice Stevens, dissenting in McNeil, found that the majority's ruling would have no
practical effect because defendants would be likely to invoke Miranda rights at the initial appearance. 647 The practical effect of
McNeil may lie in a footnote in Justice Scalia's opinion, responding to this argument. He strongly implied that Miranda rights
could be invoked only in the context of custodial interrogation,
not anticipatorily. 648 According to Justice Scalia, a contrary rule
would lead to the unacceptable conclusion that Miranda rights
644. Id. at 2208.
645. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988) (rejecting argument
that Edwards rule should not apply when police initiated interrogation following
suspect's request for counsel which occurs in context of separate investigation).
646. McNeil, Il1 S. Ct. at 2210 (emphasis omitted).
647. Id. at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
648. Id. at 2211 n.3.
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could be invoked in a letter prior to arrest. 649 Justice Scalia did
not explain, however, why the sixth amendment right to counsel
can be invoked anticipatorily65 0 while the fifth amendment right
to counsel cannot.
V.

CONCLUSION

The premise of this article is not that the Rehnquist Court
should be engaged in a full-scale overruling of Warren or Burger
Court precedent. Rather, the Rehnquist Court should fulfill its
role as a Supreme Court, and continually evaluate and analyze
applicable precedent, rather than mechanically apply it. Constant
evaluation of supporting authority serves several important purposes. It forces all to rethink the fundamental premises of legal
doctrine. It allows courts and lawyers to resolve, in an honest
fashion, the new legal problems that arise in a changing society.
It furthers the current and historical legitimacy of the Court as an
institution. It provides for easier resolution of future cases. Finally, direct and honest treatment of applicable law allows for
true reconsideration, so that yesterday's mistakes can be terminated without damage to future cases.
With a few notable exceptions, the 1989-90 term shows that
the Rehnquist Court has failed to act as a Supreme Court, at least
in the area of the fourth and fifth amendments, and that this failure has continued in the 1990-91 term. All too often there appears to be an obsessive single-mindedness to clear the docket, to
decide the case before the Court at all costs. But the inevitable
result of this short-sighted tactic is that confusion and dissatisfaction permeates the Bench and Bar, leaving even more future
docket-clearing for the Court. It is about time that the Court
faces up to its responsibilities. The Court can do so by examining
the underlying principles of fourth and fifth amendment law that
it has recently taken for granted.
649. Id
650. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986) (sixth amendment
request for appointment of counsel does not apply solely to representation in
formal legal proceedings).
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